[6] In contrast, Jane Mansbridge has identified four views of democratic political representation: promissory, anticipatory, surrogate and gyroscopic.
Anticipatory, surrogate and gyroscopic representation, on the other hand, are more modern views that have emerged from the work of empirical political scientists.
This is the preferred (and very common) method for democratic countries, where elected representatives will be chosen by similarly-sized groups of voters defined by single-member districts.
[14] This form of representation tends to occur as a political necessity for unifying many independent actors, such as in a federation (e.g. NATO, the UN).
For example, the American Constitution contains rep-by-area features due to smaller states already holding disproportionate power in the proceedings from the Articles of Confederation.
Prince Edward Island has more than expected representation in Parliament (in the Commons as well as the Senate) relative to Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, due to the historical reason that PEI was a colony equivalent constitutionally to Upper Canada and Lower Canada prior to Confederation.
Models of representation refer to ways in which elected officials behave in representative democracies.
The delegate model of representation suggests that representatives have little or no capacity to exercise their own judgement or preferences.
It is a hybrid of the two models discussed above and involves representatives acting as delegates and trustees, depending on the issue.
A mandate is an order or instruction from a superior body therefore this model suggests representatives follow the party line and must carry out policies outlined during election campaigns.
[23] Pitkin also argues that substantive representation should be apparent through the nature of government action between elections.
[24] Thus, substantive representation is predicated on the fact that democracy is evident between elections rather than isolated to formal procedures like voting.
"[26] Among these scholars is Michael Saward (2010), who argues that substantive representation should be constructed as a process of "claims-making" in which representatives "speak for" their constituents.
[28] Substantive representation is not a universally accepted concept; minimalist theorists like Adam Przeworski (1999) reject the idea that representatives can be driven to act in the best interests of the public.
[30] Nonetheless, democratic theorists often consider substantive representation to be salient due to its emphasis on action in office, particularly in relation to the interests of women and ethnic minorities.
In Lesotho, quota-mandated female representation has had no effect or even reduced several dimensions of women's engagement with local politics.
[40] Evidence also shows that while caste-based quotas may not change stereotypes of how people view the oppressed caste group, they do change the social norms of interaction between caste groups[41][note 1] Dyadic representation refers to the degree to which and ways by which elected legislators represent the preferences or interests of the specific geographic constituencies from which they are elected.
As Carey and Shugart (1995, 417) observe, they have "incentives to cultivate a personal vote" beyond whatever support their party label will produce.
Personal vote seeking might arise from representing the public policy interests of the constituency (by way of either the delegate, responsible party, or trustee models noted above), providing it "pork barrel" goods, offering service to individual constituents as by helping them acquire government services, and symbolic actions.
Miller and Stokes (1963) presented the seminal research of this kind in an exploratory effort to account for when alternative models of policy representation arise.
Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995), offer the most advanced theoretical exposition of such representation for the U.S. Congress.