Power transition theory
According to Organski: An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor.
[4]: 22 According to Organski in his textbook, World Politics (1958):An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor.
[5]Steve Chan summarizes the theory as "the danger of systemic war is greatest when a rising challenger catches up with or even overtakes a declining hegemon.
Eugene R. Wittkopf explores past wars and their relation to power transition theory in his 1997 book World Politics: Trend and Transformation.
[2] A review by academics Xinru Ma and David C. Kang of articles first-tier journals found that the case most analyzed under power transition theory was the Anglo-German rivalry of the 20th century.
[7][8] International relations scholars Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu find that the challenger not only seeks to increase its material power but also to promote its own ideological and normative frameworks as alternatives to those propagated by the hegemon.
These peaking power dynamics help explain some of the most consequential geopolitical events of the past 150 years, including the surge of U.S. imperialism in the late nineteenth century, the outbreak of World War II, and Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine.
[4]: 6 They write that this approach creates a Eurocentric "blind spot" and overemphasizes the importance and generalizability of the European and Western historical experience.
