After the election, voters (or perhaps proxies acting on their behalf) can visit the Web Bulletin Board (WBB) and confirm their receipts appear correctly.
An example of such a form is shown below: In the booth, Anne extracts her ballot form from the envelope and makes her selection in the usual way by placing a cross in the right-hand column against the candidate of choice (or, in the case of a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system for example, she marks her ranking against the candidates).
Note that because the candidate list is removed before scanning, the machine that reads the ballot paper never learns the content of the vote.
It replaces the visual cryptographic encoding the voter's choice in Chaum's scheme by the conceptually and technologically simpler candidate randomization.
The Prêt à Voter idea of encoding the vote through permutations has subsequently been incorporated in Chaum's Punchscan scheme.
The first implementation of Prêt à Voter, by a team led by the University of Surrey, won Best Design, and overall second place at the 2007 University Voting Systems Competition, after the winning team, Punchscan, uncovered a security flaw in the random number generator portion of the Prêt à Voter source code [5] .
[6] An EPSRC-funded project, Trustworthy Voting Systems, ran from April 2009 to April 2014, and aimed to enhance the design of Prêt à Voter in various ways, to build a full prototype implementation, and to produce mathematical proofs of the claimed security properties of Prêt à Voter.