Prajñākaragupta (also: Prajñakara, Sanskrit, Tibetan: shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa, ca.
[1][2][3] Prajñākaragupta introduced several original innovations to the school of Dharmakīrti, such as the doctrine of backwards causation and a revised theory of perception.
[2][4] According to Eli Franco, Prajñākaragupta is "arguably the most important and most original Buddhist philosopher after Dignāga and Dharmakīrti".
[2] Prajñākaragupta's philosophy is found in his extensive Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (henceforth PVA, sometimes also called Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam) which survives in a single Sanskrit manuscript.
[3] It also survives in a Tibetan translation by Blo ldan śes rab et al. as the Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgyan (Tengyur, Derge edition, Toh 4221).
[7][8][1] Prajñakara's view of the relationship between the two pramāṇas (epistemic instruments which give us knowledge) of perception (Sanskrit: pratyakṣa) and inference (anumana) differs significantly from that of Dharmakīrti.
[9] However, inference can still be seen as a secondary kind of epistemic instrument, since it can lead a person to accomplish their intention (Pramāṇavārttika 3.56).
Thus, since inference has pragmatic efficacy, it can be called a pramāṇa, even if it is a concept that does not know the actual form of the object, and is thus ultimately erroneous.
Prajñākara claims that when it comes to perception, the initial non-conceptual awareness that directly presents an object cannot even be considered a pramāṇa, since it does not prompt one to act (pravartaka) pragmatically.
[11] The way this works is that after repeated experiences, the mind is able to manifest a previous direct perception as a clear image (spaṣtākāra) which becomes the object (viṣaya) for a subsequent cognition.
[2] In his defense of this theory, Prajñākaragupta appeals to the doctrine of “following co-presence and co-absence” (anvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitva) as the definition of causality and dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda).
[12] Prajñākaragupta gives several examples of backward causation, such as one's pleasant feeling which is influenced by one's future happiness, or omens of death (ariṣṭa) that individuals perceive.
Commentators like Śākyabuddhi had interpreted this passage as defining existence via causal efficacy (in this case, the power to produce a perception).
[2] This view is drawing on the argument originally put forth by Dignaga in favor of mind-only idealism (cittamatra) which argues from "the necessity of things only ever being experienced together with experience" (Sanskrit: sahopalambhaniyama).
All other cognitions and perceptions are relative and only established at the level of convention (vyavahāra), including Dharmakīrti's analysis of causal force.
Prajñākaragupta explains the theory of self-reflexive awareness by arguing that all phenomena arise from conscious luminosity (prakāśa).
[16] At the core of Prajñākaragupta’s thought is the wisdom of non-duality (advaya-jñana) which is the ultimate means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).
[2] Dharmakīrti had further defined "pramāṇa" as that which illuminates unknown objects (ajñātārthaprakāśo vā) and as that which is a "knowledge without deception" (avisaṃvādi jñānam).
Prajñākaragupta identifies it with what Dharmakīrti calls the insight (yukti) that leads to the end of suffering (Pramāṇavārttika chapter II v. 139).
Prajñākaragupta agrees, but also gives an alternative explanation: "yukti is union (yoga), which means that all phenomena are interconnected beyond all differences, that is, non-duality (advaita)" (PVA 116,16-19).
For Prajñākaragupta, all other forms of Buddhist epistemology which do not discuss non-duality are ways to gradually lead a person to higher and subtler levels of wisdom, culminating in the nondual cognition (advaitāvabodha).
[18] Prajñākaragupta’s fundamental view of reality as non-dual consciousness is another reason why he thinks that time is fictional and unreal and why backwards causality is possible.
Since the wisdom of non-duality is the ultimate pramāṇa (epistemology), this means that it is a kind of perception (pratyakṣa), defined as a “cognition that is free of conceptual construction” (kalpanāpoḍha).
[19] Specifically, it is a yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) in which a true object appears in a vivid non-conceptual way after repeated practice (abhyāsa) of meditation and reflection on the teachings.
According to Prajñākaragupta, the Sākāravāda view is a consequence of Dignaga's classic proof of idealism from "the necessity of things only ever being experienced together with experience" (sahopalambhaniyama).
Furthermore, Prajñakara goes further than Dharmakirti and the commentator Dharmottara in asserting the unity (ekatva) of the object and consciousness (not merely denying their inseparability).
[20] Indeed, for Prajñākaragupta, the apprehension (aparokṣatā) of a cognitive object and the ultimate reality of conscious manifestation or illumination (prakāśa, lit.
According to Prajñākara, if consciousness exists without images or forms, then it cannot perceive the sensations (vedana) related to specific objects.
[21] This view draws and expands on the theory of diversified non-duality (citrādvaita) which was proposed by Dharmakīrti in order to explain how diversity is perceived simultaneously by the mind as a single unified direct perception.
This argument is structurally similar to the theory of simultaneous perception of objects and knowledge (sahopalambhaniyama), in that both rely on the inability to separate or discriminate the contents of experience or to know them independently of each other.