Presidential eligibility of Donald Trump

However, the Supreme Court in Trump v. Anderson (2024) reversed the ruling in Colorado on the basis that state governments did not have the authority to enforce Section 3 against federal elected officials.

[1] In December 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court in Anderson v. Griswold ruled that Trump had engaged in insurrection and was ineligible to hold the office of President, and ordered that he be removed from the state's primary election ballots as a result.

Section 3 of the amendment prohibits anyone from holding public office if they had previously sworn an oath to support the Constitution, but then "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the [United States], or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof."

[36][37][38] In August 2023, two prominent conservative legal scholars, William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen, wrote in a research paper that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualifies Trump from being president as a consequence of his actions involving attempts to overturn the 2020 United States presidential election.

[50][47] While the political question doctrine of the Supreme Court for non-justiciability was established in Marbury v. Madison (1803),[51][52] the modern test for whether a controversy constitutes a political question was established in Baker v. Carr (1962) with six criteria: In establishing the constitutional avoidance doctrine of judicial review, the Supreme Court formulated a seven-rule test in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) for the justiciability of controversies presenting constitutional questions: Excluding cases covered by the preceding Original Jurisdiction Clause, the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause of Article III, Section II states that "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

"[57] In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey (1988), the Supreme Court held that public or agency reports that "[set] forth... factual findings" have "assume[d] admissibility in the first instance" as evidence in courts under Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (which were enacted by Congress in 1975),[58][59][60][61] and established a four-part non-exclusive test to determine the trustworthiness of such reports as admissible evidence if questioned: In September 2022, the CRS issued a report on Section 3 that cites an opinion article co-authored by South Texas College of Law Houston professor Josh Blackman and Maynooth University law professor Seth Barrett Tillman (which in turn summarized a law review article Blackman and Tillman co-authored) in noting that the Presidency is not explicitly included in the text of Section 3, and as such, could possibly be exempt from the section's terms.

[87] Conversely, after examining appointment practices during the 1st United States Congress, and using a corpus linguistics analysis of The Federalist Papers, the Anti-Federalist Papers, Elliot's Debates, Farrand's Records, An Universal Etymological English Dictionary compiled by lexicographer Nathan Bailey, and other contemporaneous dictionaries, Antonin Scalia Law School professor Jennifer L. Mascott has argued that the original public meaning of "officer" as used in the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section II encompassed any government official with responsibility for an ongoing governmental duty and likely extended to officials not currently appointed as Article II officers.

[138][139][140][141] In upholding the authority of Congress to issue the corporate charter for the Second Bank of the United States in 1816 under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section VIII, the Supreme Court noted in McCulloch v. Maryland that the 1st United States Congress actively debated whether issuing the corporate charter for the First Bank of the United States was constitutional, but "After being resisted first in the fair and open field of debate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet... [the bill] became a law" in 1791, and as the law was "[a]n exposition of the Constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts... [and] not to be lightly disregarded", the Court concluded that whether Congress had the authority to incorporate a bank by the time of the McCulloch decision could "scarcely be considered as an open question".

[161][158][162] Citing a law review article written by Indiana University School of Law professor Gerard Magliocca,[163] the CRS report notes an exchange in congressional debate between Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson and Maine Senator Lot M. Morrill during the drafting process of Section 3 in concluding that it could be more likely that the President is an officer of the United States subject to disqualification under the section: [Mr.

[195][204] In Fischer v. United States (2024), the dissenting opinion written by Associate Justice Amy Coney Barrett noted that the Supreme Court did not hold that the Electoral College vote count is not an official proceeding under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.

[195][213] While the Supreme Court held in Martin v. Mott (1827) that "The authority to decide whether the exigencies contemplated" under the Militia Clause and the Militia Act of 1795 "have arisen, is exclusively vested in the President, and his decision is conclusive upon all other persons",[214] Lynch argues that it is unlikely that Congress or courts would allow for public office disqualification pursuant to Section 3 strictly on a President's judgement of whether an insurrection has occurred due to potential abuse of power.

... [I]f any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said punishments, at the discretion of the court.

[236] Based on the concurrent majorities in favor of the sole article in the second Trump impeachment in the House and the impeachment trial in the Senate, and the passage of the Congressional Gold Medals bill in August 2021, Baude and Paulsen argue that Congress has effectively designated the January 6 Capitol attack as an insurrection,[237][18][19] while Graber argues that the January 6 Capitol attack falls within the meaning of "insurrection" within pre-14th Amendment federal and state case law.

[243][244] The CRS and Baude and Paulsen cite the Prize Cases as concluding that citizens of the Confederate States of America, while not foreign, qualified as "enemies" for law of war purposes,[240] and Baude and Paulsen cite the Court as stating in the Prize Cases that "It is not the less a civil war, with belligerent parties in hostile array, because it may be called an 'insurrection' by one side, and the insurgents be considered as rebels or traitors.

[256] Baude and Paulsen, Graber, and Lynch cite the exclusion of former Secretary of the Treasury Philip Francis Thomas from the Senate in 1867 as an example of disqualification for "giving aid or comfort to ...

It is inconceivable that the House of Representatives, which without such an express provision in the Constitution repeatedly asserted its right to exclude Members-elect for disloyalty, should ignore this plain prohibition which has been contained in the fundamental law of the Nation for more than half a century.

[319] After refusing to consult with Johnson on the indictment and as he sought the presidential nomination at the 1868 Democratic National Convention,[320] Chase shared his view on Section 3 with Davis' attorneys privately that the clause was self-executing.

[323][324] After Chase and Virginia U.S. District Court Judge John Curtiss Underwood split on the motion to dismiss (with Chase voting in favor of the motion and Underwood voting to sustain the indictment), the case was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court but was ultimately rendered moot when Johnson granted pardons for ex-Confederates including Davis in December 1868, and the prosecution formally withdrew the indictment in the early months of the next year.

[99] While the Supreme Court had held in Ex parte Garland (1867) that a full presidential pardon "releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt... as if [the offender] had never committed the offence... [and if] granted before conviction... prevents any of the penalties and disabilities... upon conviction from attaching",[332] the Supreme Court subsequently held in Burdick v. United States (1915) that a pardon "carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it".

[192][193] Citing Stevens and remarks made by Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull in congressional debate on the Enforcement Act of 1870, Lash argues that many members of Congress during the drafting history of Section 3 believed that the clause required enabling legislation.

[354] Blackman and Tillman also note that the House of Representatives had seated Victor L. Berger for the 66th United States Congress despite his conviction under the Espionage Act in February 1919 and did not remove him from his seat under Section 3 until the following November,[355] and that Clay, Mason, and Eaton were chosen by state legislatures—whose members were bound by the Oath or Affirmation Clause and the Supremacy Clause—in indirect elections prior to the ratification of the 17th Amendment as additional examples that demonstrate that Article I qualifications are enforced by discretion and are not self-executing.

[367][368] Blackman and Tillman also claim that the plaintiffs in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948),[369] Brown v. Board of Education (1954),[370] Roe v. Wade (1973),[371] and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) invoked the Second Enforcement Act of 1871 as codified in Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code for relief as examples.

[396][397][398] Baude and Paulsen also note that the Supreme Court in Ex parte Garland and Cummings v. Missouri (1867) explicitly distinguished the criminal punishments in bills of attainder and ex post facto laws from constitutional qualifications for public office.

"[409][410][403] Along with Magliocca and the CRS, Baude and Paulsen note that following Chase's rulings in the Jefferson Davis treason indictment and Griffin's Case that Congress passed the Enforcement Act of 1870 to effectuate Section 3 by permitting federal prosecutors to issue writs of quo warranto for its enforcement,[411][412] and Baude and Paulsen also note that the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867 also incorporated the text that would ultimately be included in Section 3.

[459][460] The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Lubin v. Panish (1974) that ability to pay a filing fee as a condition for ballot access was unconstitutional,[461] while the Supreme Court struck down a pair of Ohio ballot access laws in Williams v. Rhodes (1968) and Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983) for being discriminatory towards third party and independent candidates in violation of the right to freedom of association under the 1st Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.

"[477] The Court also stated that "the Framers understood the [Congressional] Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power ... to evade important constitutional restraints.

[198][446] In Burroughs v. United States (1934), the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Corrupt Practices Act because that law "[n]either in purpose nor in effect ... interfere[d] with the power of a state to appoint electors or the manner in which their appointment shall be made",[521] and since presidential electors "exercise federal functions under... the Constitution... Congress [possesses the power] to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard [presidential elections] ... to preserve the departments and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption.

[538] By the end of October, John Anthony Castro, a candidate for the 2024 Republican presidential nomination, had sued Trump based on the Fourteenth Amendment in at least 26 federal district courts across the country.

[554][552] By early January 2024, Castro had filed a second lawsuit in New Hampshire,[555] and appealed the district court rulings in Florida,[556] Arizona[557] and West Virginia,[558] but had a case dismissed in Nevada.

[563] On November 29, 2023, the Eastern Washington U.S. District Court dismissed a claim against Trump under section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment that a Spokane Valley resident had filed too early for subject matter jurisdiction to apply.