It provides an assumption in drug-possession cases that if a person is found with more than a specified amount of a controlled drug, they are in possession of it for the purpose of supply or sale.
[1] In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the presumption of supply is inconsistent with section 25(c) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
The legal burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to prove that he or she did not possess the drug for purposes of supply and it was intended for personal use.
[9] This reverse onus clause is controversial[10] because of its inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which stipulates that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
[12] It has been questioned whether the statutory presumption of possession for supply should continue to apply after the Supreme Court's decision in R v Hansen.
[13] Case law in overseas jurisdictions suggests that restricting the supply of illicit drugs is a pressing social objective which might, in certain circumstances, justify limitations on the presumption of innocence.
[21] Hansen contended that consistency with the presumption of innocence would be achieved if section 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 was construed to impose an evidential burden on him which, if accepted by the jury, might create a reasonable doubt of his possession being for supply.
This would impose the legal onus on the Crown to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of drugs for supply.
However, section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act forced the court to allow the presumption-of-supply clause to prevail, and Hansen's appeal was unsuccessful.
Although several recommendations were implemented, it was found that greater clarity on the impact of costs and resources was required to determine the full effects of a new act and drug-classification system (including the presumption of supply).