[1] These principles may stipulate basic procedural rights afforded to anyone facing an adjudicative process or procedure that affects fundamental rights and freedoms, and certain substantive standards related to the rule of law that regulate the actions of the state (e.g., the rule against unclear or vague laws).
The degree of protection dictated by these standards and procedural rights vary in accordance with the precise context, involving a contextual analysis of the affected person's interests.
In written law, the term fundamental justice can be traced back at least to 1960, when the Canadian Bill of Rights was brought into force by the Diefenbaker government.
According to the legal scholar Walter Tarnopolsky, the wording of the clause sparked some controversy among those drafting the Bill.
While the term "fundamental justice" does appear in section 7 of the Charter, this is to limit the rights to life, liberty and security of the person.
Beetz went on to find that in this case, refugees had been denied hearings, and thus their section 2(e) and fundamental justice rights were infringed.
"Due process" was rejected because in the United States, use of that term in the constitution led to judges expanding its meaning (see Lochner era) in ways the Canadian government felt would be undesirable.
As constitutional scholar Peter Hogg points out in his book Constitutional Law of Canada, the new wording of section 7 removed the context of the "fair hearing" found in the Canadian Bill of Rights, which meant the definition of fundamental justice was now ambiguous and could still be further developed by Canadian courts.
Motor Vehicle Act, the meaning of the words "fundamental justice" in section 7 has been greatly expanded and encompasses much more than mere procedural rights.
As Professor Hogg has said, "The common law rules [of procedural fairness] are in fact basic tenets of the legal system, and they have evolved in response to the same values and objectives as s.
212–13, Wilson J. recognized that the principles of fundamental justice demand, at a minimum, compliance with the common law requirements of procedural fairness.
Insofar as procedural rights are concerned, the common law doctrine summarized in Baker infra, properly recognizes the ingredients of fundamental justice.