Private language argument

Historians of philosophy see precursors of the private language argument in a variety of sources, notably in the work of Gottlob Frege and John Locke.

[2] Locke is also a prominent exponent of the view targeted by the argument, since he proposed in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that the referent of a word is the idea it stands for.

This account is found, for example, in Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and more recently in Jerry Fodor's language of thought theory.

He considers how it comes about that the listener associates this with the number of items, rather than the type of nut, their colour, or even a compass direction.

One conclusion of this is that to participate in an ostensive definition presupposes an understanding of the process and context involved, of the form of life.

[9] In the case of the sensation S, Wittgenstein argues that no criterion exists for the correctness of such an ostensive definition, since whatever seems right will be right, and that only means that here we cannot talk about "right".

One common interpretation is that the possibility exists that one might misremember the sensation, and therefore one does not have any firm criterion for using S in each case.

So memory scepticism could be applied with equal effect to ostensive definitions given in a public language.

This interpretation (and the criticism of Wittgenstein that arises from it) is based on a complete misreading[citation needed], however, because Wittgenstein's argument has nothing to do with the fallibility of human memory[citation needed] but rather concerns the intelligibility of remembering something for which there is no external criterion of correctness.

Wittgenstein makes this clear in §258: "A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.—Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation.—But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future.

Hence, to appeal to a private ostensive definition as the standard or correct use of a term would be "as if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true."

In this ordinary language case, it makes sense to ask questions such as "is this the tree we named T yesterday?"

That is, in the case of a public language there are other ways to check the use of a term that has been ostensively defined.

"[12] A recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work is that for some term or utterance to have a sense, it must be conceivable that it be doubted.

Rush Rhees, in his notes on lectures given by Wittgenstein, while discussing the reality of physical objects, has him say: We get something similar when we write a tautology like "p → p".

[13]As Kenny put it, "Even to think falsely that something is S, I must know the meaning of S; and this is what Wittgenstein argues is impossible in the private language.

The beetle-in-a-box is a famous thought experiment that Wittgenstein introduces in the context of his investigation of pains.

If we accept pains as special qualia known absolutely but exclusively by the solitary minds that perceive them, this may be taken to ground a Cartesian view of the self and consciousness.

Alternatively, one might take a behaviorist line and claim that our pains are merely neurological stimulations accompanied by a disposition to behave.

"That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation', the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

[24] In 1982 Saul Kripke published a new and innovative account of the argument in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.

He develops the paradox into a Grue-like problem, arguing that it similarly results in skepticism, but about meaning rather than about induction.

[26] He supposes a new form of addition, which he calls quus, which is identical with plus in all cases except those in which either of the numbers to be added is greater than 57, thus:

He claims that his argument shows that "Each new application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted to accord with anything we may choose to do.

"[27] Kripke's account is considered by some commentators to be unfaithful to Wittgenstein,[28] and as a result has been referred to as "Kripkenstein".

Even Kripke himself suspected that many aspects of the account were inconsistent with Wittgenstein's original intent, leading him to urge that the book "should be thought of as expounding neither 'Wittgenstein's' argument nor 'Kripke's': rather Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him.

Remarks in Part II are referenced by their Roman numeral or their page number in the third edition.