Instead, Project Waler was cancelled by the Australian Government in July 1985 due to concerns over the cost and capabilities of the proposed vehicles.

Project Waler is sometimes cited as an example of a mismanaged Australian defence procurement process, with commentators noting that it had been over-ambitious and not enough emphasis was placed on keeping costs down.

The department believed that the ADF should focus on preparing for low-intensity conflicts, and placed a low priority on the Army's armoured forces and artillery.

In line with this view, the Army's leaders took advantage of the discord within the Department of Defence to pursue a force structure optimised for conventional warfare and rapid deployment overseas.

[11] The Army began considering acquiring Australian-built light armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to replace its M113s in 1973, but formal work to explore this option did not commence until 1980.

[12] They were to include variants optimised for transporting troops, reconnaissance, command and control, ambulance functions, repairing and recovering armoured vehicles, carrying radar and moving cargo.

[19] The government saw Project Waler as a significant opportunity for the Australian manufacturing industry to produce technologically advanced military equipment.

[22] The Department of Defence's annual report for the 1981–1982 financial year stated that "as far as practical" the Project Waler vehicles "are to be designed, developed and made in Australia".

[27] Exploratory studies undertaken by the Department of Defence at the outset of Project Waler broadly identified the characteristics considered desirable for the AFVs.

[28] At this time the Australian defence procurement process was very complex, with projects being required to pass through fourteen steps between an initial feasibility study and final approval.

These steps involved several committees and working parties and required the defence industry to submit very detailed proposals that were costly to prepare.

The Bulletin noted that this was a good example of the approach the military was taking at the time to involve the defence industry in procurement processes.

[34] The development work involved the companies providing outline designs for other variants, as well as information on the expected costs and how the vehicles could be built in Australia.

[20] In December that year the Minister for Defence, Gordon Scholes, announced that the studies confirmed that it would be feasible to build the vehicles in Australia.

[39] The vehicles would be more expensive than comparable designs produced overseas as Australian industry would not be able to achieve economies of scale due to the relatively small number to be procured.

[42] A terrain analysis study of north western Australia was undertaken using geographic information system software to identify the most important environmental factors to be considered when designing the vehicles.

[43] Increasing demands on the defence budget during the mid-1980s contributed to a reassessment of Project Waler, as the military needed to focus funds on its highest priorities.

The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Minister for Defence Kim Beazley shared this view, as he believed that the Army needed to become more mobile by using vehicles that were easier to transport between locations.

[36] The government decided to cancel Project Waler on 24 July 1985, and directed the Army to prepare new plans for recapitalising its fleet of transport vehicles that were focused on increasing its mobility rather than its armoured protection or firepower.

[48] The Canberra Times reported that it had proven difficult to tailor the Project Waler designs to Australian conditions, and that the government regarded them as unsuited to Australia's needs.

[50] During a parliamentary question time session in May 1986, Beazley stated that the requirements which had been set for the Project Waler vehicles were unsuitable given Australia's needs.

He gave as examples the expected weight of the vehicles' armour preventing them from being carried by the RAAF's C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and the project documents requiring that they have the capacity "to keep going for a period of one hour after a nuclear attack on the battlefield with a loss of half its crew".

Dibb stated in the report that other military and civilian experts had disagreed with this view, including by noting that it would have been difficult to transport the Waler vehicles by air.

[18] The 1987 Defence White Paper, which was influenced by the Dibb Report, included commitments to upgrade some of the M113s and purchase "faster, more mobile wheeled light armoured fighting vehicles, carrying weapons and surveillance equipment suitable for northern contingencies".

[57][58] The basic vehicles were built in Canada, then shipped to Adelaide in South Australia where British Aerospace undertook final fitting out before they were issued to the Army.

This was because they did not provide adequate protection against heavy machine guns, most forms of modern anti-tank missiles, mines and large improvised explosive devices.

[73] A decision on the type of IFV to be purchased was originally scheduled for 2022, but was delayed until 2023 to align with the Defence Strategic Review that was completed in March that year.

[79] A December 1985 editorial in The Sydney Morning Herald judged that Beazley was correct to cancel it as the Army's objectives were over-ambitious and producing the vehicles in Australia rather than buying them from overseas would have led to wasteful spending.

He also stated that the failure of these projects may have discouraged firms from submitting bids for subsequent Defence procurement exercises given the costs involved in preparing proposals.

[82] The Canberra Times's defence correspondent Frank Cranston wrote in 1991 that upgrading the M113s instead of purchasing the vehicles intended under Project Waler would not meet the Army's needs for large numbers of highly mobile AFVs.