The PRU was the tasked with finding and neutralizing the Vietcong (VC) cadre and their political leadership of under the Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War.

[2]: 8 A typical post-1967 provincial PRU organization was the one found in Tây Ninh Province in III Corps.

Some were former Special Forces soldiers or former members of a Citizen Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), while a few were simply local youths who did not want to join the regular ARVN and preferred to serve their country in their own home province.

In a few provinces, some paroled criminals were allowed to join the PRU, but the number of such people was few and greatly reduced after 1968.

Some had strong religious and community affiliations that made them natural enemies of the VC, such as Catholics, Cao Dai, Hòa Hảo and Montagnard tribesmen.

According to Colonel Terence M. Allen, the senior military advisor to the PRU Program in Saigon from 1968 to 1970, the most effective PRU teams were those who were recruited among the Cao Dai and Catholic religious communities and the Montagnard tribes since these groups had a visceral hatred of the VC and a vested interest in protecting their communities from the ravages inflicted on them by the VC.

The Marine PRU advisors normally wore black pajamas or tiger-striped camouflage uniforms in the field and civilian clothes while in garrison.

This wide assortment of weapons posed a logistical challenge to some PRU teams, but in most cases there were never any serious shortages of ammunition.

[2]: 12 PRU forces were equipped with ground transport in the form of commercial light trucks and motorcycles, which were purchased by the CIA.

As a result, the PRUs also used public transportation, such as cyclos and buses, or privately owned motorcycles or bicycles to insert themselves into operational areas.

For operations over long distances and in mountainous terrain, the PRUs would rely primarily on U.S. helicopters for insertion and extraction.

Most U.S. PRU advisors felt the PRUs would have been even more effective had they possessed additional organic transportation assets, such as three-quarter-ton trucks and motorcycles, and a dedicated helicopter package in each military region.

Since most PRU targets were fleeting in nature, a timely response, often within 24 hours, was needed to achieve success.

As the program matured, the necessity to fully coordinate PRU arrest orders and operations with the province chiefs became institutionalized.

A great deal of authority and independence of action was given to the PRU advisors, often amounting to outright autonomy.

Since many POICs were busy with their primary duties, not the least of which was the collection of political and strategic intelligence on the enemy’s Central Office for South Vietnam and the North Vietnamese government, they simply did not have the time to micromanage the PRU advisor.

The American PRU advisors were unanimous in their recommendation that the best men for assignment to this form of duty should be in the age range of 25 to 30 years old and should have obtained at least the equivalent rank of Sergeant (E-5) for enlisted and First lieutenant (O-2) for officers.