[16] However, United States and South Korean officials pointed out that the missile was fired from an underwater barge rather than a submarine, and that it flew only 100 m (330 ft) above the water.

Video showed the 10-ton missile firing directly vertical out of the water, unlike the first test that emerged at a distinct angle.

While there is a chance to take out land-based nuclear sites, ballistic missile submarines ensure that a retaliatory strike could still be launched before it can be found and neutralized.

[8] A more likely scenario would be deployment along the Korean coastline within North Korean local air and surface cover and silent movement into or out of various hiding spots like bays, inlets, and outer isles before achievement of a pre-designated position, with quiet submerged operation on battery power; because of its finite power capacity, the sub would have to surface or snorkel for air to recharge its batteries if it remains hiding for an extended period, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts.

[1] On 24 August 2016 at around 5:30 am (Pyongyang Standard Time), North Korea successfully tested the Pukguksong-1 as the missile flew 500 km (310 mi) into Japan's ADIZ without issue.

[40][41] In light of recent development of the Pukguksong-1, South Korean military sources concluded that the first successful Pukguksong-1 test was in fact launched in lofted trajectory.

This is without confirmation of the actual apogee, and therefore the range could have been at least 1,000 km (620 mi) or more had the missile launched in normal trajectory and could be operationally deployed as early as 2017.

Specifically, North Korea still faces significant technological challenges, including building a new class of submarine to carry three such missiles at once.

[3] On the same day, the South Korean media reported that Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), since recommends that South Korea deploy 2 batteries of THAAD instead of 1 in order to counter the possibility of North Korea's firing a Pukguksong-1 outside its 120-degree field of vision.

[44][45] On 3 September 2016, US expert Bruce Bechtol, a North Korea expert at Angelo State University, and another South Korean national security researcher, Shin Jong-woo, claimed that China must have provided North Korea with the relevant SLBM technologies, since it took a mere 4 months from the first successful cold launch test (23 April 2016) to the first complete test (24 August 2016) and further claimed that the Pukguksong-1 is a carbon-copy of first China's first SLBM, JL-1.

Bruce Bechtol also stated his analysis is supported by space program expert Tal Inbar of Israel's Fisher Institute.

[46][47] On 5 September 2016, the Chinese media refuted the report by citing that the People's Republic of China as a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory state and stating that one of the permanent members of United Nations Security Council would never proliferate by providing or selling nuclear and missile-related technologies to North Korea.