However, such conceptual objections seem less strong since the decision of the House of Lords in McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 where Lord Wilberforce rode roughshod over objections to widening the class of valid discretionary trusts on the basis that there would be difficulty ascertaining beneficiaries for the court to enforce the trust in favour of.
Cases such as Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves Jr 399 and Re Astor [1952] Ch 534 re-affirm the court's disinclination to enforce trusts that are not specific and detailed.
Purpose trusts have been attacked conceptually on the basis that it would amount to the delegation of a testamentary power,[3] although subsequent cases have cast doubt on the correctness of that reasoning.
Provisions for the building or maintenance of tombs or monuments have been upheld as a matter of common law, although solely on the basis of ancient precedent.
In Re Hooper [1932] 1 Ch 38 a trust for the maintenance of graves was upheld, but the court indicated that it would not have done so had it not been bound by Pirbright v Salwey [1896] WN 86.
[6] In Re Dean (1889) 41 Ch D 552, North J upheld a trust for maintenance of horses and hounds for 50 years relying upon much older authorities[7] and the monument cases.
The most commonly cited example is Re Thompson [1934] 342[9] where a gift to a friend of the testator for the promotion and furthering of fox hunting was upheld.
[10] In Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232 it was made clear that the existing exceptions at common law would not be extended; they were described as "troublesome, anomalous and aberrant".
A number of offshore jurisdictions have enacted statutes which expressly validate non-charitable purpose trusts outside of the small group of specific exceptions recognised at common law.
In Re Recher's Will Trust [1972] Ch 526 a more purposive approach was taken, and Brightman J held that a gift to The London and Provincial Anti-Vivisection Society was to be construed as a beneficial gift in favour of the members, not so as to entitle them to an immediate distributive share, but as an accretion to the funds of the society subject to the contract of the members as set out in the rules.