No official relations between Arab League countries and GCC members Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain (during part of 2014 and 2017–18); Egypt, Jordan, Comoros, Mauritania, and Yemen (2017–2018).

[10][11][12] Bilateral relations have been especially strained since the beginning of the Arab Spring,[13] that left a power vacuum both states sought to fill, with Qatar being supportive of the revolutionary wave and Saudi Arabia opposing it.

[citation needed] The Tunisian Revolution of January 2011[17] ousted longtime president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who fled to Saudi Arabia after being denied asylum in France.

Since the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, there has been a consistent pattern of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt opposing the designs of Qatar and Turkey, who supported democratic Islamist and Salafi extremist groups, particularly in the Syrian Civil War.

When Salman of Saudi Arabia ascended to the throne in 2015, the two began to cooperate more in Syria and fought alleged Houthi militias in the Yemeni Civil War.

[20] In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, the Maldives, Mauritania, Senegal, Djibouti, the Comoros, Jordan, the Tobruk-based Libyan government and finally the Hadi-led Yemeni government severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and blocked Qatar's airspace and sea routes along with Saudi Arabia blocking the only land crossing over its relations with Iran, Al-Jazeera reporting negative information about other GCC states and Egypt and the country's alleged support of Islamist groups.

[26] As of June 2024 Saudi Arabia has welcomed the resumption of diplomatic representation between the UAE and Qatar, reflecting continued efforts to stabilize and enhance inter-GCC relations.

[28] According to Jim Krane, energy research fellow at Rice University's Baker Institute, "Qatar used to be a kind of Saudi vassal state, but it used the autonomy that its gas wealth created to carve out an independent role for itself...

[34] United Arab Emirates politicians claim that "Qatar invests billions of dollars in the U.S. and Europe and then recycles the profits to support Iranian-aligned Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and groups linked to al Qaeda.

While Qatar hosts the American military base from which the U.S. directs its regional war against extremism, it also owns media networks responsible for inciting many of the same extremists".

[39] A senior fellow of Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations concludes that "There's a recognition of the general tendencies of the Gulf states to hedge their bets,"There's always a question in the back of the minds of the leadership--how much faith can they put in the U.S.?

"[39] On 27 May 2017, the newly reelected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani held a phone call with Qatar's Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

[32][52] According to the WSJ, during President Barack Obama's first term, some members of his National Security Council lobbied to pull a U.S. fighter jet squadron out of Al Udeid to protest Qatari support of militant groups in the Middle East.

[54] During a March 2014 meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, after which the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain announced the recall of their ambassadors to Qatar,[55][56][57] citing interference with their internal affairs.

[58][15][59] Some economists have interpreted the 2014 Saudi–Qatari rift as the tangible political sign of a growing economic rivalry between oil and natural gas producers, which could "have deep and long-lasting consequences" beyond the Middle East-North Africa area.

[60] In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Sudan, Senegal, Djibouti, Comoros, Jordan, the Tobruk-based Libyan government and the Hadi-led Yemeni government severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and blocked Qatar's airspace and sea routes along with Saudi Arabia blocking the only land crossing over its relations with Iran, Al-Jazeera reporting negative information about other GCC states and Egypt and the country's alleged support of Islamist groups.

The Kremlin denied involvement, and the government of Qatar claimed the hack instead originated in the boycotting Gulf states not Russia after tracking suspicious cellphone signals.

[77] Arab media claimed that Qatar has secretly accepted to become part of an Iranian Shia sphere of influence that Tehran is trying to create in the Middle East, and which would include Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria (Assad), and Iraq (Shia-majority government)[78] and that, in a phone conversation with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Emir Al Thani said he wanted the ties with Iran to be "stronger than ever before.

[80] Arab media also claimed that a member of Qatar's ruling House of Thani, Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser bin Abdullah Al Ahmed Al Thani, tweeted that Qatar's ruler Tamim has "joined forces with Iran against your brothers and set up terrorist groups and published electronic battalions to beat your opponents.

"[81] Saudi media also alleged that Iran Revolutionary Guards are protecting Qatar's ruler Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani inside his palace.

[87][88] On 5 January 2021, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani visited the city of Al-Ula in Saudi Arabia for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit.

Saudi, along with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, signed an agreement to restore full diplomatic relations with Qatar, and to end the three and a half years of blockade.

[91] On 16 January 2021, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia Faisal bin Farhan announced that his country will be re-opening their embassy in Qatar, as part of the Al-Ula deal of reconciliation.

Qatari-backed Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated candidate Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's first democratically elected president in 2012, only to be overthrown the next year by a Saudi-supported military coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, after widespread protests against his rule.

As the Syrian government met protests with deadly force, Qatar continued to be the main supporter of the resulting armed rebellion and eventual full-scale civil war.

When Qatar and Turkey became increasingly influential in Syria, Saudi Arabia joined the conflict to overthrow Assad as he became more dependent on Iran and Russia to cling to power.

[citation needed] Saudi Arabia later joined the UAE in supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces, which has clashed with Qatar's ally Turkey in northern Syria.

[citation needed] From 2016 onwards, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has courted Qatar and Turkey in order to ward off a potential challenge to his leadership by Mohammed Dahlan, who is supported by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt.

[115][116][117][118][119][120] In 2007, Qatar assumed a mediating position with the aim of facilitating dialogue and potentially orchestrating a peace agreement between the government of Yemen and the Houthi insurgents, a group adhering to Zaidi Shia Islam and based in the Saada Governorate in the north.

[125][126] Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia are major financiers for Jordan, and the Jordanian authorities have long been afraid such tensions could provide more opportunities for Iran to destabilize the region.