Late and modern Sunni jurisprudence regards analogical reason as a secondary source of Islamic law along with binding consensus, following the Quran, and prophetic tradition.
Imam Bukhari, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and Dawud al-Zahiri for example, rejected the use of analogical reason outright, arguing that to rely on personal opinion in law-making would mean that each individual would ultimately form their own subjective conclusions.
Professor Walîd b. Ibrâhîm al-`Ujajî of Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University explains the opposition to qiyas as coming from multiple angles:[2] Scott Lucas, when mentioning Ahmad Dallal’s position on Salafism, states that Dallal: Imam Bukhari maintained a negative position towards qiyas, as he held views aligned with the Zahiris of his time.
[citation needed] Lucas also points out common mistakes other scholars make when analyzing Bukhari’s position on qiyas.
The biggest source of confusion for scholars is the fact that, while rejecting qiyas, Bukhari accepts the idea of tashbih (comparison), which seems similar to analogy.
With the Malikite and Hanbalite schools eventually granting full acceptance as the Hanafites and Shafi'ites already had done, the overwhelming majority of Sunni jurists from the late period onward affirmed its validity.
Twelver Shi’a regard the ulama (scholars) as authorities in legal and religious matters during the Occultation (ghayba) of the Imamah Mahdi.
In modern interpretations of Twelver Shi’ism, the most revered and learned scholars are styled as references for emulation (marja taqlīd).
This system of deriving legal principles effectively replaces both the Sunni notion of consensus (ijmā’) and deductive analogy (qiyās)[25] Accordingly, in the chapter on Knowledge of the Twelver collection of prophetic traditions, Kitab al-Kafi, one finds many traditions cited from the Imams that forbid the use of qiyās, for example: The Imam (a.s.) said, "My father narrated from my great-great-great-great grandfather, the holy Prophet (s.a.) who said, ‘Those who act on the basis of analogy will face their destruction and lead others to their destruction.
[27] Bu Ishaq Quhistani referred to the Quranic tale of Adam and Eve to support his argument for the necessity of a perfect teacher who could provide spiritual edification (ta’līm) in place of what he felt were subjective whims and wayward personal opinions (ra’y).
The supreme teacher therefore exists at all times for the imperfect human intellects to submit (taslīm) to, as is proclaimed in the divine dictate: Today I have perfected your faith for you, completed My favour upon you, and chosen Islam as your way.Primarily being a school of theology and not jurisprudence, the Mu'tazila generally did not hold independent positions on such issues.
The majority of the Mu'tazila, despite being a distinct sect from both Sunni and Shi'ite Islam, still preferred the juristic school of Abu Hanifa, with a minority following Al-Shafi'i's views.
The issues of ra’y, qiyas, and rationalism were all represented within the Inquisition, and Hallaq states “The Mihna thus brought to a climax the struggle between two opposing movements: the traditionalists, whose cause Ibn Hanbal was seen to champion; and the rationalists, headed by the caliphs and the Mu’tazilites, among whom there were many Hanafites”[31] Christopher Melchert similarly argues that the Mihna demonstrated a relationship between the Hanafis of Baghdad, who were associated with the heavy use of qiyas, and the Mu’tazilites.
Other Islamic scholars at the time, however, argued that the term qiyas refers to both analogical reasoning and categorical syllogism in a real sense.