Quibéron mutinies

In consequence, représentant en mission Jean Bon Saint-André, the naval expert of the National Convention, was called to Brest to reestablish order and reorganise the Navy.

[9] Others, such as Kerguelen or Lemarant-Boissauveur, had suffered humiliations from the naval establishment of the Ancien Régime, doubling the republican loyalty of their political convictions with personal resentment against the old order.

[10] Rear-admiral Landais would carry revolutionary fervour and suspicion to the point of denouncing Lelarge and Morard de Galles as suspect, and be considered as paranoid by Jeanbon Saint-André.

[3] France declared war on Great Britain on 1 February 1793, and very quickly, the British made contact with Royalist guerrilla forces in Vendée and Brittany.

This made it necessary not only to protect French merchant convoys in the English Channel, but also to patrol the shores of France and prevent any potential British support from reaching the Chouans.

By 22 May, the forces in Quibéron were so considerable that Morard de Galles was sent to take command,[14] with four more ships of the line;[15] In June, the three-deckers Terrible and Bretagne prepared to depart under Rear-admiral Lelarge, but the crews refused to set sails and the officers had to request help from the municipalities to establish their authority over their own men.

[16] Morard's mission was two-fold: protect inbound convoys depredation of the Royal Navy; and establish a watch and blockade of those departments tempted by Chouannerie.

[2] These instructions were in fact contradictory: protecting convoys entailed sailing in the open sea, while blockading the Chouans required ships as close to the shore as possible;[17] therefore, Morard could not fulfill both missions without splitting his forces,[2] but from the station where he was ordered, off Quiberon, between Groix and Belle Île,[4] he could perform neither.

[Note 1]Morard repeatedly wrote to Dalbarade for clarification his orders, complaining that they "contradict[ed] themselves at each paragraph"; eventually he even requested to be replaced, but to no avail.

[17] On 10 August, a war council was held on Terrible, where all senior officers agreed that the state of the fleet was becoming critical and that it was urgent to sail back to Brest, but Dalbarade was unmoved.

[19] In early September, Morard received the third task of intercepting a Dutch convoy; this required to detach a five-ship division, thus dividing and exposing his forces.

[20] There again, it was determined that the fleet was in no condition to continue its mission and should return to Brest; Tréhouart ordered it made so, in the interest of the safety of the ship[3] and of the pretence of command.

They connected the mutinies to the Federalist revolts[23] and likened them to the surrender of Toulon, already mentioned by the mutineers to justify their will to return to Brest; from there, they extrapolated the existence of a Royalist or Girondin plot to destroy the fleet.

[11] Jeanbon Saint-André and Prieur de la Marne launched purges of noble officers, destituting Vice-admirals Kersaint and Girardin, Rear-admirals Lavilléon and Lelarge, and 71 ship-of-the-line captains.

[26] In the same decree, Captain Villaret-Joyeuse, who had successfully maintained order on Trajan[27] and had good relations with Jeanbon Saint-André,[24] was promoted to Rear-admiral and put in command of the Brest fleet.

Vice-admiral Morard de Galles commanded the Brest squadron.
Rear-admiral Kerguelen-Trémarec commanded a six-ship division. He was very critical of the dispositions taken by Minister Dalbarade , and later wrote a bitter account of the incident in his Relation des combats et des évènements de la guerre maritime de 1778 entre la France et l'Angleterre .
Représentant en mission Jean Bon Saint-André reestablished order by terror in the aftermath of the mutinies.