R v Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 is a landmark[2] decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which held that life sentences without a realistic possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
And secondly, those types of punishments that are not in of themselves incompatible with human dignity, but nonetheless can become cruel and unusual if their duration or extent is grossly disproportionate to the appropriate sentence, having regard to the seriousness of the offence and offender's degree of responsibility.
[13] At trial, the Crown asked for all the murder sentences to be served consecutively pursuant to section 745.51 of the Criminal Code, for a total parole ineligibility period of 150 years.
[3]: paras 12–19 Ultimately the trial judge held that the gravity of Bissonnette's offence necessitated a sentence greater than the baseline 25 years of ineligibility, but that the 50-year period would be grossly disproportionate as applied to him, and thus constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
[3]: paras 20 & 24 Chief justice Richard Wagner, writing for a unanimous court, rejected the Crown's appeal and held section 745.51 to be unconstitutional.
[3]: paras 59–70 The Court held that a life sentence that deprives an offender from the onset of any realistic possibility of release falls within the narrow class of punishments that can never be imposed under the Charter.
The Court also noted that Parliament had already deprioritized rehabilitation to other sentencing objectives for first degree murder by a setting a parole ineligibility period of 25 years, which though constitutional was also longer than many of Canada's counterparts in the developed world.
[3]: paras 81–98 The Court also emphasized the psychological effects of such a sentence, holding that offenders deprived of any opportunity of release have no incentive to improve themselves and live a futile existence.
Justice minister David Lametti said that while the government had supported the law, they would respect the ruling and review its implications, while also acknowledging the hurt and anger rekindled by the decision.
[15] The decision was also criticized by some media editorials as devaluing the lives of the victims, and as judicial activism,[16][17][18][19] while others defended it as a just limitation on the retributive power of the state.