[3] The sentence was subsequently shortened to 35 years in prison when an appeal court upheld a lesser charge for aiding and abetting genocide.

[4][5] According to testimony during his trial, Krstić was first assigned to the Sarajevo garrison from 1972 to 1981, where he attended secondary military school at a hub called "Josip Broz Tito".

While this assignment was very sought-after by career-minded military officers, Krstić insisted that his family remain in Sarajevo, in the hopes that he might be reassigned there.

Due to the unrest that had begun brewing in that region, he was posted to Kosovska Mitrovica in early 1987 as Chief of Staff of the Motorised Brigade.

He was immediately assigned with the rank of lieutenant colonel to the post of the Commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, which was located in the Sokolac garrison.

On the Serbian Orthodox holiday of St. Ilija's Day in August 1993, behind the positions of Krstić's units that were engaged in the front line in the area of Kladanj, there was a synchronised infiltration of Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the villages in the territory of the Han Pijesak municipality, such as Žerovice, Rijeka , and Potkosovaca were destroyed and most of their inhabitants killed.

His predecessor also briefed him and told him that, despite the status of the safe area accorded to Srebrenica and Žepa and the obligations stemming from agreements on demilitarization, the forces of the 28th Mountain Division of the Eastern Bosnia Corps in Srebrenica and Žepa were, in fact procuring from Tuzla and Kladanj or directly from Sarajevo more weapons in addition to the light or infantry weapons they already had.

[4] There were numerous reports from Serb intelligence sources of the BiH Army troop movements in and out of protected enclaves carrying arms, reconnoitering Serb positions, and other military actions against Tuzla, Živinice, and Kladanj, all using UN protectorates as a base of operations in the region and operating under the radar so as to avoid notice by UNPROFOR.

He was also briefed about intel on the continuation of the army, weapons and ammunitions supply to the members of the 28th Brigade at the protected area.

He was discharged from the military hospital at his request and stayed for a couple of days with his family in Kosovska Mitrovica, before returning to Bosnia with his wife to report to his doctors in Sokolac and Vlasenica for further treatment.

The 28th Division of the 2nd Corps then occupied the villages of Višnjica and Rječice, where they attacked the VRS Main Staff from the direction of Banja Lučica and Krivace.

This territory was held until 26 June, when the Drina Corps fortified their defenses and managed to halt and then repel the BiH Army back to their initial positions.

[7] Since the UN-protected enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa were never demilitarized, and that they hid what amounted to "five or six brigades" of BiH Army troops and weapons, the VRS Main Staff ordered the Drina Corps Command to undertake an operation codenamed Krivaja 95.

This was in response to a 8 March 1995 directive from the Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić himself (although it is believed that Krstić was a co-planner), ordering that "The Command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to operations directive number 7 and 7/1 of the GS VRS, and on the basis of the situation in the Corps area of responsibility, has the task of carrying out offensive activities with free forces deep in the Drina Corps zone, as soon as possible, in order to split apart the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica, and to reduce them to their urban areas.

By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity, with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica or Žepa.

The directive laid out support for combat operations by ordering that "[t]he relevant state and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material and weapons to the Muslim armies that are hiding inside the safe area, making them dependent on our goodwill while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the International Community and international public opinion.

[11] Subsequently, the Drina Corps requested that the VRS provide the cooperation of the 65th Protective Motorised Regiment, as well as that of the 1st and 2nd Podrinje Light Infantry Brigades.

A sudden flare-up of fierce resistance by the BiH Army against all VRS axes delayed the commencement of the operation by several days, and resources were concentrated on re-acquiring territory lost in these attacks.

"[11] Resistance by the Eastern Bosnia Corps' 28th Division was finally beginning to wane, and Mladić had just effectively relegated Krstić to the role of an observer.

Throughout the night and the next day, the VRS pressed forward, making gains in enough key areas to control all of the needed strategic positions to take Srebrenica.

After the area was cleared and more forces arrived, Krstić and the other Generals departed the forward command post and reassembled in Srebrenica.

That night at a meeting with Mladić, Krstić was placed in charge of infantry forces that would be conducting an overnight march toward Žepa in preparation for combat operations there.

The former were taken in groups to isolated locations such as Čerska Valley, Kravica warehouse, Orahovica, Branjevo Farm, Petkovci Dam and Kozluk, where they were blindfolded, and executed.

[12] Krstić then allegedly undertook to arrange that men from the Bratunac Brigade assist with the Branjevo Farm and the Pilica Dom executions.

On 13 July there was a flurry of preparatory measures involving scouring the terrain for remaining members of the 28th Division, organizing mine groups to detect minefields and conduct demining operations, removing obstacles on roads within the protected area as well as roads between units and the staging area for the Žepa operation.

[14] Despite losing some of his forces in a transfer to augment operations in the Alibegovac and Kak areas, on the morning of 17 July, the march on Žepa commenced, with the attack building to full swing a few days later.

[16] On Wednesday, 2 December 1998, Krstić was driving through the village of Vršani on the Bijeljina-Brčko road while en route to Banja Luka on business when his car was disabled by road spikes and he was pulled through his car window and taken into custody in a joint SAS-Navy SEAL operation launched by SFOR.

The Republika Srpska and Yugoslav governments expressed outrage, and even Russia protested against the manner in which Krstić was detained, in that it took place in an area of Bosnia patrolled by the Russian SFOR contingent, which was not apprised of the operation.

[2] The three men – Indrit Krasniqi, Iliyas Khalid and Quam Ogumbiyi – were sent for trial at Leeds Crown Court.

On 18 February 2011, the trio were found guilty of "wounding with intent to commit grievous bodily harm", but were acquitted of attempted murder.