His Majesty's Railway Inspectorate

However, the inspectorate had no powers to require changes until the Railway Regulation Act 1842 ('An Act for the better Regulation of Railways and for the Conveyance of Troops') gave the BoT powers to delay opening of new lines if the inspectorate was concerned about "Incompleteness of the Works or permanent Way, or the Insufficiency of the Establishment" for working the line.

In the early years of the inspectorate, their competence to adjudicate on civil engineering structures was questioned by critics, sometimes with good reason.

A reorganisation of the inspectorate in November 1846 abolished the post of inspector-general, and led to the departure of Major-General Charles Pasley, the incumbent, and one of his subordinates.

[13] Subsequently, and consequently, the BoT took the view that (as it explained in defending itself from criticism that the defects in the Tay Bridge should have been seen and acted upon by the inspectorate): "The duty of an inspecting officer, so far as regards design, is to see that the construction is not such as to transgress those rules and precautions which practice and experience have proved to be necessary for safety.

The BoT could now set up a formal court of inquiry to investigate an accident, taking evidence on oath in public hearings.

[16] Subsequent public inquiries under the new powers included those into the Shipton-on-Cherwell train crash in 1874 (chaired by an inspector William Yolland), and into the Tay Bridge disaster of 1879.

However, the procedure fell into abeyance after the failure of the three-man board (of which Yolland, by now chief inspecting officer, was a member) of the Tay Bridge inquiry to arrive at an agreed report.

Yolland's official report on an 1867 accident (in which eight people died at a junction unaltered since an 1862 fatal accident, despite an inspector having urged improvements) pressed for such powers: Their Lordships have no control whatever over railways after they are once opened for traffic, however defective and dangerous the structures and permanent way may be, and however imperfectly the construction of junctions and the laying out of altered station yards may provide for the public safety.

It is true that the practice of the Department is to send one of the inspecting officers to inquire into and report upon the circumstances attending accidents, as in this and the former collision at Walton Junction, and such inquiries are submitted to by the railway companies; but their Lordships are not empowered to make an order for anything to be done.

No responsibility appears to attach to any person for the complete neglect exhibited towards Captain Tyler's recommendations; and the unfortunate signalman of thirty years' service, who was, I have no doubt, as he thought, doing his duty properly, is the only person to whom any liability attaches; whereas the expenditure of a small sum would have prevented him from inadvertently committing the act for which he will shortly be tried for manslaughter, and have saved the railway company a very large sum of money that must now be paid as compensation for those who suffered.

[17]Tyler himself supported the view taken by successive governments: that to take such powers would remove the clarity of existing arrangements, where responsibility for passenger safety lay with the railway companies alone.

[18] The death of 80 people on a Sunday school outing in the Armagh rail disaster of 1889 brought a reversal of this policy on the three key issues: within two months of the accident Parliament had enacted the Regulation of Railways Act 1889, which authorised the Board of Trade to require the use of continuous automatic brakes on passenger railways, along with the block system of signalling and the interlocking of all points and signals.

[20] The last chief inspecting officer with a Royal Engineers background, Major Rose, retired in 1988 and he was replaced by an appointee from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

After the move to the HSE, (newsworthy) train crash investigations tended to be held as public inquiries presided over by a High Court judge; and the findings published.

As a result of the legislative change, which transferred them to the Office of Rail Regulation, the scope of HMRI enforcement no longer covered guided bus, trolleybus and most cable-hauled transport systems.