Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War

The Reich Plenipotentiary for the Total War Effort (Reichsbevollmächtigter für den totalen Kriegseinsatz) was a position created by Adolf Hitler, the Führer ("leader") of Nazi Germany, on 23 July 1944 for Joseph Goebbels, who was also at the time the regime's Propaganda Minister.

In order to achieve this, the total commitment of all our resources and reserves is necessary," and he attempted to get Hitler to agree to a complete mobilization of the civilian population, for instance using women for work, and closing shops and cafes he considered to be luxuries.

[5] Keitel, in particular, was aware of the military manpower shortage, and had complained in December 1941 that unnecessary personnel should be eliminated from the Reich government bureaucracy, from private corporations and even from within the non-fighting portion of the Wehrmacht itself, but attempts to achieve this had only managed to generate more red tape.

On 18 February 1943, he made a nationally broadcast speech from the Berlin Sportpalast before a hand-picked audience of 14,000 Nazi die-hards,[7] in which he extolled the necessity of a Spartan way of life in order to achieve total war.

[10][b] Goebbels roused his audience with rhetorical questions; he was interrupted more than 200 times by shouts, slogans and wildly enthusiastic applause: Are you and the German people determined, if the Leader orders it, to work ten, twelve, and, if necessary, fourteen and sixteen hours a day and to give your utmost for victory?

Applause][11]One remarkable passage from the speech included Goebbels's ironic description of onrushing Russian invaders that near perfectly described the Nazi operations in the Eastern theater.

To this end, Goebbels stated, "Behind the oncoming Soviet Divisions we see the Jewish liquidation commandos, and behind them, terror, and the specter of mass starvation and complete anarchy.

He also learned that, due to failures of the Luftwaffe to protect German cities from Allied air attacks, Hermann Göring had fallen out of Hitler's favor.

[20] In his meeting with Hitler, Goebbels pulled out all the stops, painting the darkest possible picture of the situation, demeaning his possible rivals, such as Göring and Keitel, and making elaborate promises for the benefits of a total war effort, such as a million new soldiers for the Wehrmacht.

He offered a Germany teetering on the brink of doom that only total war could save it from, and he averred that the people were behind the changes he proposed: they wanted and expected tough measures in a severe crisis.

All these factors come together to finally convert Hitler to the idea that only a full-out total war effort could turn the tide, and he appointed Goebbels as "Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War" on 23 July 1944;[22] in theory with full authority, thus freezing out both the Committee of Three and Göring, who saw himself as the natural choice for that role,[23] as both a military leader—he was the head of the Luftwaffe—and, at least on paper if no longer in fact, the czar of the German economy as Plenipotentiary in charge of the Four Year Plan.

Göring's reaction to not having been appointed to the position was to take to his hunting estate in East Prussia; he refused to visit Hitler at his Wolf's Lair headquarters for weeks.

[25] Goebbels contacted the leaders of the Reich and the Nazi Party to persuade them that every action of the agencies and organizations under their control should be measured by how they would be received by front-line soldiers and armaments workers.

[2] Goebbels also attempted to bring control of the newly organized Volkssturm ("People's storm") units into his total war effort, only to be out-maneuvered by Bormann and Himmler, who had come to an agreement with each other to split the responsibility.

[28]Sharing the assessment made by Evans, historian Michael Burleigh prefaced his discussion of Goebbels and the fanatical pursuit of "Total War" in his work The Third Reich: A New History with a review of the state of German morale caused by negative reports from the front and the relentless Allied bombing campaign, which immediately after the short-lived fever of total war mobilization, was further drained by "military disasters and the persistence of wartime inequalities"; all of which contributed to a progressive isolation of the Nazi leadership.

[29] Burleigh also highlights how the "exhortations of heroic death and sacrifice bore scant resemblance" to the German people's mood and that the "population shrank from anything tainted with ideology" but preferred the solace they found in the Church to deal with their loss and grief.