The state-owned Reichswerke was seen as a vehicle of hastening growth in ore mining and steel output regardless of private capitalists' plans and opinions, which ran in alignment to Adolf Hitler's strategic and economic vision.

In November 1937, Reichsminister of Aviation Hermann Göring obtained unchecked access to state financing and launched a chain of mergers, diversifying into military industries with the absorption of Rheinmetall.

[5] It provided one-eighth of German steel output during the Second World War[6] and created a Nazi-controlled military complex that was independent of private interests.

Its weapons and munitions assets were integrated into the Ministry of Armaments; the mining and steel core of the Reichswerke continued operation under Göring's supervision until the end of the war, albeit at a loss.

[12] Influential people inside the Nazi Party, including Hitler's economic advisor Wilhelm Keppler, rallied to increase domestic iron ore mining.

[12] In December 1936 Göring announced that domestic ore, iron and steel program had become a national priority and that he would not tolerate hesitation or obstruction by private owners of the resources.

Göring's aim of bringing the economy in line with Adolf Hitler's strategic plans was fully supported by the Nazi press.

[15] The danger of relying on ore imports was proven by the strikes and anti-Nazi sentiment in Sweden and by the success of the Popular Front in France.

[16] Fearing creation of excessive industrial capacity and cutthroat competition with the state, they cautiously discussed the ways of curbing Göring's ambitions.

[18] The Ruhr attempted a coordinated response, but wire-tapping and surveillance gave Göring advance knowledge of the steel barons' moves and he preempted their organized action through personal threats and promises.

[22] Another local camp, Drutte, supplied slave workers for the Reichswerke's ammunition plants from 1942 (see List of subcamps of Neuengamme, Celler Hasenjagd).

[23] After the removal of Schacht in November 1937, the Reichswerke rapidly grew while privately held steel mills of the Ruhr were deprived of capital (their capacity remained at 16 million tons p.a.

Immediately after the Anschluss, Göring advised VS to speed up mining its Austrian ores, and again the private business refused for fear of overproduction.

[30] Alpine's ore resources were vital for Göring's second great project – the new vertically integrated cluster of steel mills in Linz which also included Eisenwerke Oberdonau and numerous construction and shipping companies.

[32] Göring, in his functions of President of Prussia and Chief of the Luftwaffe, also established close ties between the Reichswerke and the oil and aircraft industries.

[33] Relationships between the state and steel barons continued to deteriorate, and Göring used the same pattern of intimidation to extort other Austrian and later Czech assets from their past owners.

[4] Takeover mechanisms ranged from bona fide stock purchase to control by proxy through dependent local banks to outright confiscation, as was the case of the British-owned Rothschild family mill in Vitkovice.

[7] In Germany, the Reichswerke effectively subdued the Ruhr barons by forcing them to supply coal to Salzgitter blast furnaces, commissioned in 1939, at below-market price.

It declared itself "a trustee for the German state" for the duration of the war, a white knight saving occupied countries from "colonialism" of big business.

[41] Richard Overy noted that Göring's obsession with long-term mega-projects not only drained the economy, but was in stark contrast with the ideology of blitzkrieg.

[51] Inability to control the huge conglomerate became evident in 1942, and Pleiger persuaded Göring to limit the Reichswerke to coal, iron, and steel production.

[55] The ore mines in Erzberg and the steel mills in Linz, destroyed by allied air raids, were reorganized into the state-owned VÖEST (now part of Voestalpine).

[57] Salzgitter was flooded with forty four thousand German refugees from the East,[58] unemployment exceeded 30%, and the British considered physically resettling the residents in fear of a communist uprising.