The origin of the war in Rhodesia can be traced to the conquest of the region by the British South Africa Company in the late 19th century, and the dissent of native leaders who opposed foreign rule.
[citation needed] In his famous "Wind of Change" speech, UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan revealed Britain's new policy to only permit independence to its African colonies under majority[which?]
[citation needed] Amidst this backdrop, African nationalists advocated armed struggle to bring about black rule, primarily denouncing the wealth disparity between the races.
[36] Soviet military technology quickly appeared in the Zimbabwean countryside and by 1979 ZIPRA were utilizing SAM weaponry to target Rhodesian civilian assets and Viscount aircraft.
[40] The Rhodesian government contended that it was defending Western values, Christianity, the rule of law, and democracy by fighting Communists, but it was unwilling to compromise on most political, economic and social inequalities.
[41] The Smith administration claimed that the legitimate voice of the black Shona and Ndebele population were the traditional chiefs, not the ZANU and ZAPU nationalists, whom it regarded as dangerous, violent usurpers.
[citation needed] The war ended when, at the behest of both South Africa (its major supporter) and the United States, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government ceded power to Britain in the Lancaster House Agreement in December 1979.
Many of the overseas volunteers came from Britain, Ireland, South Africa, Portugal, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States with the latter three being held in high regard for their recent Vietnam War experience.
The Rhodesians also used more modern types of aircraft like the Hawker Hunter and Canberra bombers, the Cessna Skymaster as well as Aérospatiale Alouette III (SA316) helicopters until they were supplemented by the Agusta Bell 205.
[49] At the beginning of the first war, much of Rhodesia's military hardware was of British and Commonwealth origin, but during the course of the conflict, new equipment such as Eland armoured cars were procured from South Africa.
[50] The Rhodesians also produced a wide range of wheeled mine-proofed armoured vehicles, often using Mercedes Unimog, Land Rover and Bedford truck components, including unlicensed copies of the Mercedes-Benz UR-416.
Because ZAPU's political strategy relied more heavily on negotiations than armed force, ZIPRA grew slower and less elaborately than ZANLA, but by 1979 it had an estimated 20,000 combatants, almost all based in camps around Lusaka, Zambia.
Soviet military technology quickly appeared in the Zimbabwean countryside and by 1979 ZIPRA were utilizing SAM weaponry to target Rhodesian civilian assets and Viscount aircraft.
These proposals proved largely repugnant to the mostly white electorate, which feared that premature black ascendancy would threaten Rhodesia's economic prosperity and security, as well as their own personal affairs.
The embargo meant that Rhodesia was hampered by a lack of modern equipment but it used other means to receive vital war supplies such as oil, munitions, and arms via the apartheid government of South Africa and Portugal.
The black nationalists continued to operate from secluded bases in neighbouring Zambia and from FRELIMO-controlled areas in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, making periodic raids into Rhodesia.
By 1973, guerrilla activity was increasing in the aftermath of the Altena Farm raid, particularly in the northeast part of the country where portions of the African population were evacuated from border areas, and compulsory military service for whites was extended to one year.
[83][84][85][86][87] Late in 1976, Ian Smith accepted the basic elements of the compromise proposals made by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to introduce majority rule within two years.
As the war continued to intensify, the Rhodesian Security Forces initiated a Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) programme to kill guerrillas both inside Rhodesia and in external camps in Zambia and Mozambique.
[89] First, it aimed to eliminate guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia through contaminated supplies either provided by contact men, recovered from hidden caches, or stolen from rural stores.
The Mozambican government disputed the number of casualties, saying it shot down three Rhodesian planes and a helicopter and took several thousand troops prisoner, all of which was denied by Minister of Combined Operations, Roger Hawkins.
[103][104][105] Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, condemned the incident on 1 June, and Walls announced a day later that the Rhodesian military would occupy Mapai until they had eliminated ZANLA's presence.
These operations reportedly inflicted thousands of casualties on Robert Mugabe's ZANLA cadres, probably blunting guerrilla incursions in the months that followed, but a steady intensification of the insurgency continued through 1978.
Rhodesian external operations extended into Zambia after Nkomo's ZIPRA nationalists shot down two unarmed Vickers Viscount civilian airliners with Soviet-supplied SA-7 heat-seeking missiles.
In the words of Time magazine, the ZIPRA cadres "herded together the ten people at the wreckage, robbed them of their valuables, and finally cut them down with automatic weapons fire".
As late as September 1979, despite the increased sophistication of guerrilla forces in Mozambique, a raid by Selous Scouts, with artillery and air support, on "New Chimoio" still reportedly resulted in heavy ZANLA casualties.
[n 5] However, a successful raid on the Rhodesian strategic fuel reserves in Salisbury also underscored the importance of concluding a negotiated settlement and achieving international recognition before the war expanded further.
The Zimbabwe-Rhodesian parliament voted itself out of power, and Lord Soames was appointed by the British government to rule the country as Governor-Designate, arriving in Salisbury on 12 December to take over from President Gumede.
[128] The memoirs published without editorial oversight often suffered from spelling errors and other mistakes, but tended to focus more on unit culture and non-military activities such as poaching,[129] or "taming" captured African insurgents into domestic servants.
It was printed with a favourable foreword by Mugabe and was wielded by the post-independent Zimbabwean government as evidence of the courage and sacrifices of ZANU and ZANLA, including incorporation into secondary school curriculum.