Robertson Panel
CIA historian Gerald Haines noted "A massive build-up of sightings over the United States in 1952, especially in July, alarmed the Truman administration.
On 19 and 20 July, radar scopes at Washington National Airport and Andrews Air Force Base tracked mysterious blips.
[3] The reference to White House interest is consistent with a telephone call Captain (later Major) Edward Ruppelt, Blue Book Project Director at the time, received from Brigadier General Landry, Truman's military aide, on the July 28, inquiring as to the causes of the Washington reports of the previous days.
"[8] The analyst went on to note the absence of coverage of the subject in the Soviet press, which it was felt could only represent a policy position and highlighted the "question of why and of whether or not these sightings could be used from a psychological warfare point of view either offensively or defensively.
One - the Civilian Saucer Committee in California has substantial funds, strongly influences the editorial policy of a number of newspapers and has leaders whose connections may be questionable.
"[8]These twin concerns – potential for psychological warfare and overloading of air defence systems, were formalised in a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith on September 11, 1952.
[9] This memorandum noted that although the Air Force study was adequate on a case by case basis it was not addressing the more fundamental question of enabling rapid positive identification of reports; "... the study makes no attempt to solve the more fundamental aspect of the problem which is to determine definitely the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings, or to discover means by which these causes and their visual and electronic effects may be immediately identified.
The Director of Central Intelligence advise the National Security Council of the security implications inherent in the flying saucer problem with the request that, under his statutory coordinating authority, The Director of Central Intelligence be empowered to institute through the appropriate agencies, either within or without the government, the investigation and research necessary to solve the problem of instant positive identification of "unidentified flying objects".
c. On the basis of these programs of research, CIA develop and recommend for adoption by the National Security Council a policy of public information which will minimize the risk of panic.
[9]On October 13, 1952, however, a memorandum from the Assistant Director for Intelligence Co-ordination, James Reber to the Deputy Director Intelligence argued that fundamental research into the question of positive identification was the responsibility of the Defence Department and that whilst investigating Soviet knowledge of the phenomena was a "primary concern" for the CIA it "is far too early in view of the present state of our knowledge regarding Flying Saucers for psychological warfare planners to start planning how the United States might use U.S.
Reber went on to recommend that when "... intelligence has submitted the National Estimate on Flying Saucers there will be the time and basis for a public policy to reduce or restrain mass hysteria.
"[10] As early as August 15 CIA analysts, despite their overall skeptical conclusions had noted, "Sightings of UFOs reported at Los Alamos and Oak Ridge, at a time when the background radiation count had risen inexplicably.
[1]From the IAC minutes of December 4 and the earlier CIA documents it appears clear that the Robertson Panel was the outcome of recommendation (a) of the IAC decision but that this formed part of a wider intended programme of action aimed at enabling rapid positive identification of UFOs from an air defense perspective (i.e. identifying actual Soviet aircraft from misidentified natural phenomena or other conventional objects) and a desire to reduce reporting of UFOs, which were seen as clogging up air defense communication channels and created the risk of exploitation of this effect.
The inter-relationships between these wider aspects of the CIA's recommendations and the Battelle Memorial Institute's study, culminating in Blue Book Special Report 14,[13] which identified a statistically significant difference between 'unknowns' and UFO reports that could subsequently be identified, or the study group referenced in a Canadian government document as operating as early as 1950 under the chairmanship of Dr Vannevar Bush, then head of the Joint Research and Development Board, to discover the 'modus operandi' of UFOs[14] are unclear.
Robertson told us in the first private (no outsiders) session that our job was to reduce public concern, and show that UFO reports could be explained by conventional reasoning.
Neasham and Harry Woo) then reported their conclusion that, based on more than 1,000 man hours of analysis, the two films depicted objects that were not any known aircraft, creature or weather phenomena.
At 1100 the AD/SI joined the meeting and reported that he had shown and discussed a copy of the initial rough draft to the Director of Intelligence, USAF, whose reaction was favorable ...".
This team had expended (at Air Force request) approximately 1000 man hours of professional and sub-professional time in the preparation of graph plots of individual frames of the film, showing apparent and relative motion of objects and variation in their light intensity.
Method of obtaining data of light intensity appeared faulty because of unsuitability of equipment and questionable assumptions in making averages of readings.
The Panel believed strongly that the data available on this sighting was sufficient for positive identification if further data is obtained by photographing polyethylene "pillow" balloons released near the site under similar weather conditions, checking bird flight and reflection characteristics with competent ornithologists and calculating apparent "G" forces acting upon objects from their apparent tracks.
"Whilst concluding there was nothing of scientific value in UFO reports and that there was no evidence of a direct threat to national security, the panel noted: "The Panel Members were in agreement with O/SI opinion that, although evidence of any direct threat from these sightings was wholly lacking, related dangers might well exist resulting from: a. Misidentification of actual enemy artifacts by defense personnel.
The Panel took cognizance of the existence of such groups as the "Civilian Flying Saucer Investigators" (Los Angeles) and the "Aerial Phenomena Research Organization (Wisconsin).
That the evidence presented on Unidentified Flying Objects shows no indication that these phenomena constitute a direct physical threat to national security.
That the continued emphasis on the reporting of these phenomena does, in these parlous times, result in a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of the body politic.
In order most effectively to strengthen the national facilities for the timely recognition and the appropriate handling of true indications of hostile action, and to minimize the concomitant dangers alluded to above, the Panel recommends: a.
That the national security agencies take immediate steps to strip the Unidentified Flying Objects of the special status they have been given and the aura of mystery they have unfortunately acquired; b.
That the national security agencies institute policies on intelligence, training, and public education designed to prepare the material defenses and the morale of the country to recognize most promptly and to react most effectively to true indications of hostile intent or action.
"[2]Historian Gerald Haines notes[3] that: "Following the Robertson panel findings, the Agency abandoned efforts to draft an NSCID on UFOs.
Ruppelt's 1956 book The Report On Unidentified Flying Objects[4] contained the first publicly released information about the Robertson Panel, with a summary of their proceedings and conclusions.
In 1958, the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena (NICAP), a civilian UFO research group, requested that the Air Force release the panel's report.
