[5] He was designated as a Senior Counsel by Chief Justice Manepalli Narayana Rao Venkatachaliah in 1993 at the early age of 37.

[13] While appointing him Chief Justice Manepalli Narayana Rao Venkatachaliah amended the rules as Nariman was of 37 years old and the minimum age for being made a senior in the Supreme Court was 45.

Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Assn., (2008) 10 SCC 723 is a landmark case in trademark law wherein the arguments of Nariman that the class of buyer may be relevant to the determination of a passing off action and it is not always the test of the prudent man which would apply was accepted.

He has argued the cases for theatre artist Vijay Tendulkar and the controversy-marred play Sakharam Binder.

[22] Nariman and Jasti Chelameswar formed the two judge bench of the Supreme Court of India which struck down a controversial law which gave Indian police the power to arrest anyone accused of posting emails or other electronic messages which "causes annoyance or inconvenience".

The judges held Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which made such offenses punishable up to three years imprisonment, to be unconstitutional.

[23][24][25][26][27] According to Nariman and Chelameswar, several terms in the law they were striking down were "open-ended, undefined and vague" which made them nebulous in nature.

[26][28][29][30] In a landmark judgement, a five-judge bench struck down instantaneous triple talaq by 3–2 majority and termed it void, illegal and unconstitutional.

[33] He held that the decision of five judges in the Sabarimala case which held that women of the ages of ten and fifty shall not be denied entry to the Sabarimala temple is not a fit case for the exercise of review jurisdiction as the judgment does not suffer from an error apparent on the face of record.

The dissent observed that the executive is under a constitutional obligation to implement the decisions of the Supreme Court even if they were not parties before them.

[34][35] Justice Nariman observed:Bona fide criticism of a judgment, albeit of the highest court of the land, is certainly permissible, but thwarting, or encouraging persons to thwart, the directions or orders of the highest court cannot be countenanced in our Constitutional scheme of things.