Critics also argued that Yeltsin had engaged in vote buying by utilizing state finances to fund social programs, to which he responded he was merely doing his duties as president.

Others argued that the allegations were exaggerated, and that the then United States government in fact refrained from covert operations and did not grant all of Yeltsin's requests.

When Zyuganov showed up at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in February 1996, many Western leaders and the international media were eager to see him, and treated him with regards to believing that he would likely be the next president of Russia.

The plan anticipated that the employees of the companies would consequentially pay larger income taxes, spend more on consumer goods, and increase their productivity at their jobs.

While he acknowledged that he had lost by a significant margin, Gorbachev suspected that his actual vote count still exceeded what was reported in the official tally.

[20] Fyodorov advocated for economic freedom, simple and moderate taxation, stimulation of production, and a ban on exports of most raw materials.

Despite the fact that Tuleyev dropped out of the race before the election, he had already been on the ballot during a portion of the early voting period, and he turned-in his signatures the day before the deadline.

[30] His campaign platform proclaimed: "There is only one single force that is able to unite almost all and at the same time become the ideological basis of the Russian state – popular patriotism.

[4] The campaign worked to shift the narrative of the election into a referendum on whether voters wanted to return to their Communist past (with Zyuganov), or continue with reforms (with Yeltsin).

[4][36][37] Boorish and outlandish conduct by Zhirinovsky had diminished the public perception of his stature to such a degree that, by 1996, he was seen as a buffoonish figure and was no longer seen as a viable candidate.

[4][37] The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) leader Gennady Zyuganov successfully advanced to the second-round of the election, where he was defeated by Yeltsin.

[39] Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported in 1996 that the first round of the election "appeared to be generally well run, and not seriously marred by some problems which occurred in the pre-election campaign.

"[40] The OSCE also reported: "Delegation members considered voter participation in the political campaign to be quite active compared to previous Russian elections.

"[40] In a 1996 post-election analysis published in the journal Presidential Studies Quarterly, Erik Depov asserted: "The inaccuracy of many early predictions was primarily because Yeltsin's successful re-election bid had as much to do with the dynamics of the electoral campaign as with the results of his first term in office.

If the 1996 presidential campaign proved anything, it illustrated the danger of underestimating Yeltsin's ability to meet a serious political challenge head on and prevail despite apparently insurmountable odds.

[41] Yeltsin had been utilizing state finances to fund programs (such as pensions) with the aim of convincing voters of his willingness to fulfill promises he was making on the campaign trail.

[43][39] Yeltsin had successfully enlisted the national television channels (ORT, RTR, and NTV) and most of the written press to essentially act as agents of his campaign.

Near the end of the election's first-round, the networks began also providing coverage to the candidacy of Lebed,[39] who had already agreed to support Yeltsin in the second round.

For instance, Kommersant (one of the most prominent business newspapers in the country) published an anti-Communist paper called Ne Dai Bog (meaning "God forbid").

[4] At ORT, a special committee was placed in charge of planning a marathon of anti-Communist films and documentaries to be broadcast on the channel ahead of the election.

[4] Led by the efforts of Mikhail Lesin, the media painted a picture of a fateful choice for Russia, between Yeltsin and a "return to totalitarianism".

[43] Yeltsin had managed to enlist Russia's emerging business elite to work in his campaign, including those who ran media corporations.

Igor Malashenko, Gusinsky's appointed head of NTV, even joined the Yeltsin campaign and led its media relations in a rather visible conflict of interest.

[43] In early 1996, Gusinsky and his political rival Boris Berezovsky (chairman of the Board of ORT) decided that they would put aside their differences in order to work together to support the re-election of Yeltsin.

[45] In return, Yeltsin's presidential administration allowed well-connected Russian business leaders to acquire majority stakes in some of Russia's most valuable state-owned assets.

[46] To further guarantee consistent media coverage, Yeltsin had fired the chairperson of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and replaced him with Eduard Sagalaev in February 1996.

[70] Knowing that his voter base was pro-Western, Yeltsin lobbied the then United States president Bill Clinton to speak in praising terms of Russia's transition to democracy.

"[72] In their conversations, Clinton assured Yeltsin that he would give him his publicly declared personal endorsement, saying: "I've been trying to find a way to say to the Russian people 'this election will have consequences,' and we are clear about what it is we support.

Clinton refrained from undertaking covert operations to support Yeltsin in order to prevent spurring backlash if such efforts were to be discovered.

"[75][76] Some argued that the role of the Clinton administration in securing an International Monetary Fund loan for Russia had an impact on the election, with some critics characterizing it as an act of foreign electoral intervention.