[2] The historian Rudi Matthee noted: "The massive unrest in Iran that followed shortly made practical implementation utterly impossible.
"[2] A few years later, in 1722, when the Safavid state had already entered the final stages of collapse, Russia used the treaty combination with the deaths of Russian merchants in the 1721 sack of Shamakhi as the casus belli to invade Iran.
[5] The king, Sultan Husayn, was a weak ruler, and although personally inclined to be more humane, flexible, and relaxed than his chief mullah, he went along with the recommendations of his advisers regarding important state decisions.
[6] He reigned as a "stationary monarch", preferring, apart from the occasional hunting party, to be inside or near the capital of Isfahan at all times, invisible to all "but the most intimate of courtiers".
[8] He tasked Volynsky with gathering information about Iran's military strength, silk producing provinces, and the nation's main agricultural and mineral resources.
[8] Lastly, he had to demand the Iranian government put pressure on Armenian traders from New Julfa "to honor their commitment" in relation to the privileges already given to them by Russia.
[8] He became embroiled in disagreements about protocol as he had asked whether he could "follow the Russian custom of riding his horse all the way to the Shah's quarters and whether he would be able to hand his credentials to the Safavid ruler in person and in full regalia".
[11] During his stay in Iran, Volynsky reportedly became the target of "endless humiliations", for, as Matthee notes, the Iranians had "long despised Russians for their uncouthness".
Concluding that Volynsky was a spy, and concerned that a long stay in Isfahan could allow him "to gain a full picture of Iran's lamentable military state" negotiations were kept short.
[12] Fath-Ali Khan also declined Volynsky's spurious requests to grand special rights to the Russian silk merchants and to find a "more accommodating harbor than Niazabad".
[2] The historian Rudi Matthee notes: "The massive unrest in Iran that followed shortly made practical implementation utterly impossible.
[15] In the words of Matthee: "Drawing attention to what he [Volynsky] saw as the inability of the military to defend Iran against domestic rebels and outside aggressors, he presciently foresaw the destruction of the Safavid state.
[16][17] The report stipulated that the 1721 event was a clear violation of the 1717 Russo–Iranian trade treaty, by which the latter had guaranteed to protect Russian nationals within the Safavid domains.