Sadashivrao Bhau Bhatt (4 August 1730 – 14 January 1761) was son of Chimaji Appa (younger brother of Bajirao I) and Rakhmabai (Pethe family) and the nephew of Baji Rao I.

Sadashivrao undertook his first campaign in Karnataka in 1746 because Babuji Naik of Baramati and Fateh Singh Bhonsle of Akkalkot failed in the task assigned to them.

The Nawab of Savanur was chastised, the fort of Bahadur Benda was reduced and chauth was levied from the region between the rivers Krishna and Tungabhadra.

[12] Sadashivrao's first military achievement was in 1760 in Carnatic region with Mahadjipant Purandare and Sakharam Bapu Bokil serving as advisers and commanders under him.

He conquered from the Nawab of Savanur and subsequently annexed the cities of Kittur, Parasgad, Gokak, Yadwad, Bagalkot, Badami, Navalgund, Umbal, Giri, Torgal, Haliyal, Harihar and Basavapatna.

After the death of Shahu Bhonsle I, Ramchandrababa Shenvi suggested to Sadashivrao to take the Peshwai of Kolhapur, but Nanasaheb Peshwa opposed this idea.

The news of Ahmad Shah Abdali's march towards Delhi and the subsequent death of Dattaji Scindia at the battle of Burari Ghat had arrived.

[citation needed] Abdali had formed an alliance against the Marathas with other Rohilla chieftains principally Najib-ul-Daula and the Nawab of Awadh Shuja-ud-Daula.

Unlike Malharrao Holkar and Raghunathrao, both of whom had deep knowledge of northern India, Sadashivrao was unfamiliar with the personages and politics of the region.

It was accompanied by roughly 200,000 non-combatants including family members and a large number of pilgrims desirous of making pilgrimages to Hindu holy sites in northern India as they felt safe in the presence of the army.

Despite the reservations of his generals and a shortage of time and money, Bhau formed a unit consisting of 10,000 infantry and 50 artillery pieces.

Holkar and Scindia tried to persuade Bhau to strike diplomatic ties with Suraj Mal, Jat of Bharatpur and the Rajputs, Sikhs, Shuja-ud-Daula and Muslim leaders in north India.

Therefore, both Holkar and Scindia knew Suraj Mal's strength and realised that an alliance with him was essential to win the coming war with Abdali.

Both Holkar and Scindia gave their word of honour to Suraj Mal for his personal safety while persuading him to come to the Bhau's camp.

This proved fatal on the fateful day of the final battle as the food finished and the starved soldiers and horses could not fight properly and a desperate Bhau had to order an attack.

The slow-moving Maratha camp finally reached Delhi on 1 August 1760, and took the city the next day in a battle in which artillery units were crucial in destroying the fortifications of Durrani's forces.

Therefore, Bhau moved about 110 km (68 mi) north of Delhi to Karnal (which is further north of Panipat) and captured the fortified village of Kunjpura about 10 km (6.2 mi) northeast of Karnal on the west bank of Yamuna river with a blitzkrieg offensive that demolished the fort's ramparts with artillery shelling and an attack of cavalry and musketeer units.

Ahmad Shah was encamped on the left bank of the Yamuna River, which was swollen by rains, and was powerless to aid the garrison.

However, on the afternoon of 26 October Ahmad Shah's advance guard reached Samalkha, about halfway between Sonipat and Panipat, where they encountered the vanguard of the Marathas.

A fierce skirmish ensued, in which the Afghans lost 1000 men killed and wounded but drove the Marathas back to their main body, which kept retreating slowly for several days.

In skirmishes that followed, Govind Pant Bundele, with 10,000 light cavalry who weren't formally trained soldiers, was on a foraging mission with about 500 men to gather supplies.

According to all the chronicles of the time, food in the Maratha camp ran out by late December or early January and cattle died by the thousands.

The resulting casualties and refugees fleeing to the Maratha camp caused overcrowding, supply shortages and shook the morale of Bhau's army, forcing him to turn his attention to safely transporting the civilians to Pune.

In January 1761, Bhausaheb faced famine and was blocked reinforcement due to Durrani's control of key transportation routes.

[10] On 13 January 1761, the Maratha chiefs begged their commander, Sadashiv Rao Bhau, to be allowed to die in battle than perish by starvation.

Sadashivrao Bhau along with Ibrahim Khan Gardi had planned and were executing a battle strategy to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Afghans were thoroughly softened up.

Bhau departed the battlefield to visit the corpse and plunged into the Afghan army, Vishwas rao's death had a devastating effect on the morale of his troops.

[10] Bhau, on seeing the demise of his beloved Vishwasrao, Bhausaheb came down from his elephant, climbed on a horse and plunged into the enemy lines, without realising the consequences.

Bhau enlisted the services of Ibrahim Khan Gardi in 1760 (previously served in the Nizam's army), who brought with him 2,500 trained soldiers and fifteen cannons.