Samuel W. Mitcham

: The Genesis of the Nazi Reich (1996), Mitcham attempts to explain why the Germans elected Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany.

He concludes that this is a book for the general reader, in search of what he calls a "relatively undemanding enlightenment", but he also states that experts "who wish to engage in the serious historical debates of this subject" would have to look elsewhere.

[9] The book received a positive review by the staff of the World History Group, who called it "a well-written and concientiously researched historical work".

[12] The book received a positive review by historian Lee Fullenkamp in the Parameters Journal of the U.S. Army War College.

[11] Fullenkamp wrote that it "provides those interested in World War II with a meticulously researched and highly detailed account of German forces fighting in western France in the summer of 1944 from the perspective of those who were fated to stand against the greatest armada in the history of warfare".

He focuses on personal and political differences among the officer class, which ultimately contributed to the defeat of the German forces in Normandy.

He shows that the in-fighting took on political as well as class dimensions, as illustrated by the power struggle between Gerd von Rundstedt, the nominal commander in the West, and Erwin Rommel, the de facto leader in Normandy.

[13] The book received a mixed review by historian Bradley Nicols in H-Net, noting its "excellent job [at] describing battles and establishing links between the social, political, and religious background of German officers and their actions in combat", but criticizing its methodology and a few other aspects such as its adherence to the myth of the clean Wehrmacht.

[18] Publishers Weekly wrote a positive review of the book, calling it "a sterling introduction for anyone interested in how the men who fought for Hitler ticked".

[18] In The German Defeat in the East, 1944-1945 (2001), Mitcham attempts to explain the final months of World War II on the Eastern Front, beginning with the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive and Operation Bagration, and ending with the Battle of Romania and the Siege of Budapest.

[19] The book received a mostly negative review by historian Lee Baker in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies who wrote that Mitcham utilized outdated secondary sources and provided a single-sided German perspective.

He further characterises the book as "very old-fashioned" and relying "solely upon German sources or obsolete interpretations from the Cold War era".

[22] On the other hand, historian Michael Thomas Smith, writing in the Journal of Southern History, gave the book a mostly positive review, stating that Mitcham's conclusion, (i.e that the ultimate significance of the Red River campaign was to delay William Sherman's capture of Atlanta, which was a key city because it might've cost Abraham Lincoln the re-election in 1864), , "sensible and judicious" albeit lacking in novelty.