The Sandanista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in Honduras on July 26, 1961, the eighth anniversary of the launching of the Cuban revolution by Fidel Castro.
[1] For many observers, the FSLN first became a force to be reckoned with when it executed a raid and hostage taking at a reception for the United States ambassador in Managua in December 1974.
[1] The FSLN mounted its "final offensive" in May 1979, capturing a number of cities in June, and launching a three-pronged assault against Managua in early July.
[2] Their primary missions were to deter attacks led by the United States, prevent a counterrevolutionary uprising, and mobilize internal support for the FSLN.
[2] The buildup of the regular army depended at first on voluntary enlistments, but later in 1983 a universal conscription system, known as Patriotic Military Service, was adopted.
[2] The Soviets and their allies delivered large amounts of other equipment, including 122mm and 155mm howitzers, 122mm multiple rocket launchers, trucks, and tank carriers.
[2] A mix of infantry weapons employed by the Sandinista guerrillas was gradually replaced by Soviet AK-47 assault rifles in the EPS and eventually among combat elements of the militia as well.
[2] The Sandinistas upgraded the modest air force left by the National Guard after sending personnel to Cuba and East European countries for pilot and mechanic training.
Although pilots were trained and runways constructed in preparation for jet fighters, neither the Soviet Union nor France was willing to extend credits for the purchase of modern MiG or Mirage aircraft.
[2] The United States warned that the introduction of sophisticated jet fighters would risk retaliatory strikes because of the potential threat to the Panama Canal.
[2] Under an agreement between President-elect Violeta Chamorro of the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Oppositora—UNO) and the defeated FSLN party, Humberto Ortega remained at the head of the armed forces.
[3] Ortega challenged her authority to relieve him and reiterated his intention to remain at the head of the EPS until the army reform program was completed in 1997.
[3] Under the Sandinistas, the army general staff embodied numerous branches and directorates—artillery, combat readiness, communications, Frontier Guards, military construction, intelligence, counterintelligence, training, operations, organization and mobilization, personnel, and logistics.
[3] A small EPS contingent works alongside demobilized Contras in a Special Disarmament Brigade to reduce the arsenal of weapons in civilian hands.
These BLIs constituted specialized forces capable of swift mobilization and sustained operations, particularly in the rugged terrain and dense jungles of Nicaragua where insurgent activity was prevalent.
Operating with agility and endurance, BLIs were tasked with penetrating deep into hostile territories to confront and neutralize insurgent threats, primarily targeting the Contras.
Bli were Fearless soldiers in jungle combat and possessed a keen understanding of the terrain, leveraging its intricacies to their advantage while remaining ever vigilant to the threats lurking amidst the foliage.
The recruitment efforts saw hundreds of men voluntarily enlist or were conscripted into these militias, demonstrating a commitment to serve a two-year term in defense of their nation.
These soldiers underwent rigorous training to equip them with the skills and resilience necessary to confront the complex challenges posed by insurgent forces in the region.
12 BLI'S were raised : Light Hunter Battalions (Batallón Ligero Cazador, BLC) The BLCs were another type of counterinsurgency unit, first deployed in early 1986.
While BLIs were designed to be able to operate independently, the light hunters worked in conjunction with other units, providing anti-ambush protection for more conventional forces.
[4] Beginning in 1982, the Sandinistas received from Libya the Italian-made SF-260A trainer/tactical support aircraft and the Czechoslovak Aero L-39 Albatros, a subsonic jet trainer that could be missile-armed for close-in air defense.
[4] In addition to light and medium transport aircraft, the air force acquired a fleet of helicopters from the Soviet Union that served against the Contras.
[4] After Humberto Ortega revealed that Nicaragua had approached France and the Soviet Union for Mirage or MiG fighter planes, the United States warned against introducing modern combat jets to the region.
[4] A Soviet-designed early-warning/ground-control intercept facility gave the air force the potential to control its combat aircraft from command elements on the ground.
[4] The navy's mission was to discourage seaborne Contra attacks and to deter CIA-run operations such as the destruction of diesel storage facilities at Corinto in 1983 and the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in 1984.
[4] Individual militias received weekend training in basic infantry weapons and were assigned as guards in sensitive installations or as neighborhood night watches.
[4] During 1982 and 1983, the militia had primary responsibility for border defense and thus sustained heavy casualties, while the regular army was concentrated at permanent bases.
The militia and the border guard service were both disbanded with the latter forming the Northern and Southern Military Detachments of the Army Ground Forces.