Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), is a Supreme Court case involving the burden of proof for the revocation of parental rights.

In a 5–4 opinion written by Associate Justice Harry Blackmun, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed and vacated the Appellate Division's ruling, holding that states seeking to sever parental rights irrevocably must show at least clear and convincing evidence of neglect.

Justice William Rehnquist, joined by three others, dissented, on the grounds that the majority's focus on a single aspect of the law disregarded the fairness of the scheme as a whole.

[2] Procedural due process is required any time a person faces the deprivation of life, liberty, or property.

In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court explained the level of due process required for the termination of Social Security benefits and, in doing so, established a method for determining the level of procedural due process required in depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

"[6] The Ulster County Department of Social Services received reports from neighbors and physicians of Tina Santosky regarding her injuries: a broken femur, bruises, and cuts.

[5] Under section 622 of the New York State Family Court Act, Kramer was only required to satisfy a "fair preponderance of the evidence" burden and show that permanent neglect is more likely than not.

[8] At oral argument, Martin Guggenheim argued for the petitioners that the burden of proof under New York law was unconstitutional, stating "[T]he Constitution requires that the finder of fact be reasonably convinced that the result of permanent destruction of the family is appropriate before the state may force such an irrevocable and fundamental deprivation of liberty on an individual.

While the dissent agreed with the Court's determination that parents have a due process right, they disagreed in the application of Mathews v. Eldridge.

"[14] The dissent further argued that, by focusing narrowly on only the burden of proof in the statute, the majority failed to take into account the fairness of New York's scheme as a whole.

The Colorado Supreme Court, conducting its own Mathews test, found that such a burden need not be applied to the fact-finding portion of the case.

[15][17] Seven years after the Santosky decision, the United States Supreme Court held in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that Santosky's higher burden of proof is an exception to the "conventional rules of civil litigation [...] that parties to civil litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.