[5] In 1946, work began on a pair of new British-built rocket motors, the de Havilland Sprite with a maximum thrust of 22 kN (5,000 lbf) and the Armstrong Siddeley Snarler with 8.9 kN (2,000 lbf) of thrust; these rocket motors made use of different propellants, the Sprite used a high-test peroxide (HTP) monopropellant while the Snarler harnessed a methanol/water/liquid oxygen mix.

[5] In May 1951, faced with reports on the increasingly potential capability of, and thus the threat posed by, the growing Soviet strategic bomber fleet and that nation's newly developed atomic weapons, the British Air Ministry proceeded to draft an Operational Requirement, OR 301, which sought a rocket-powered interceptor that could attain an altitude of 18,000 metres (60,000 ft) in just 2 minutes 30 seconds.

301 were considered onerous, including a ramp launch and landing on a skid, and with the compliance of the companies which had approached to tender, the amended Specification F124T allowed for a mixed powerplant configuration along with the adoption of a conventional undercarriage.

[9] Saunders-Roe had not been one of the companies who received the Specification; this is likely due to the Ministry of Supply not considering them to be relevant, as the firm had typically been involved in the production of flying boats.

[15] The changes of the defined specification mainly revolved around armament changes, adopting the Blue Jay infrared-guided air-to-air missile, which replaced the originally-envisaged retractable battery of 51-millimetre (2 in) rockets.

[15][17] Saunders-Roe, recognising that it would need to outdo the competing Avro 720 if the SR.53 was to be likely to survive, upon having been issued with the contract to build the three prototypes, set a schedule that called for a first flight to be conducted in July 1954, along with a projected service introduction date of 1957.

[18][19] However, Wood observes that this was far too ambitious as it did not leave time to address the complexity of the aircraft, nor did it accommodate room for delays in the supply of the separately-produced Spectre engine.

[19] Unresolved issues with elements of the design caused a series of setbacks, including one notable incident in the form of an explosion occurring during ground tests of the Spectre rocket engine.

Construction of the first SR.53 prototype took longer than anticipated, in part due to de Havilland having problems delivering the Spectre engine on time, installing auxiliary equipment was also time-consuming.

[22] Development with the competing Avro 720 proceeded more smoothly; by 1956, its prototype was virtually complete and was viewed as being capable of flying up to a year ahead of the lagging SR.53.

[23] By September 1953, the programme to develop these aircraft came under scrutiny due to a need to implement cost cuts; as a result, the contract for the Avro 720 was eventually cancelled.

One of the reasons for preferring the SR.53 was although the aircraft was developmentally behind, its use of hydrogen peroxide as an oxidiser was viewed as less problematic than the Avro 720's use of liquid oxygen, which posed a fire hazard.

[24] Another factor that had influenced the cancellation was the hesitancy of the RAF to back either project, the service had apparently wanted to wait until after flight evaluations had been conducted before it was to make any determination on its preference.

To this end, the firm constructed a HTP storage facility at the Hurn site; specialised radio aids were also installed and initially tested using a specially-modified Gloster Meteor which had been lent by the Ministry of Supply.

Running off the runway, the aircraft struck a concrete approach light, exploding on impact and killing its pilot, Squadron Leader Booth.

[3] It was 1957 before the first SR.53 took to the air,[2] just over a month after the infamous 1957 Defence White Paper had been published outlining the British government's policy to largely abandon piloted aircraft in favour of concentrating on missile development.

Combined with the fact that improvements in radar had meant that any incoming bomber threat could be detected much earlier, the need for an aircraft like the SR.53 had disappeared, and the project was cancelled on 29 July 1960, with the third prototype (XD153) never built.