It was formed from members elected in January 1919 to the Weimar National Assembly, which was to act as Germany's interim parliament and adopt a constitution for the new republic.

During its time in office, Scheidemann's cabinet had to deal with leftist uprisings, most notably in Berlin, the Ruhr and Bavaria, and with separatist movements in the occupied Rhineland and in eastern provinces of Prussia such as Posen and Silesia.

It was making cooperation conditional on the acceptance by the "bourgeois" parties of a republican form of state, a fiscal policy that would "severely" target wealth, and a socialisation of "suitable" industries.

Robert Schmidt (minister for Food and Agriculture) and Eduard David, with no portfolio but charged with looking into the question of what responsibility Germany had in bringing about the Great War, completed the SPD members of the cabinet.

Schiffer had been a member of the National Liberal Party and served as state secretary for the Treasury Department in the Empire but had joined the DDP after the November revolution.

[1] Two features of the cabinet are conspicuous: the balance of power between seven SPD members and seven representatives (if Brockdorff-Rantzau is counted as DDP) from the "bourgeois" parties, and the strong continuity in the personnel of government, especially considering the fact that the country had just gone through a revolution.

[9] The strong showing of the Weimar Coalition parties in the elections of 19 January 1919 were another disappointment for the radical left after the KPD and USPD had been further roused to anger against the government by the bloody suppression of the Spartacist uprising.

Between February and May 1919 numerous "wild" strikes (i.e. without union authorization), armed uprisings and occupation of plants (especially in the mining industry around Halle and in the Ruhr) took place.

On 9 March, Reichswehr Minister Gustav Noske, endowed with executive power, authorised the military and police to shoot instantly "anyone encountered who is fighting government troops with arms".

Anti-Prussian and pro-French sentiment ran high among some members of the middle-class in the Rhineland and this was used by the French and Belgian occupation forces to foster separatist tendencies.

The cabinet could react to requests for aid or action from that part of the country mainly by issuing declarations and protest notes to the Allies or by public agitation.

A new state incorporating East and West Prussia as well as Livland, Kurland and Lithuania was also mooted, drawing on earlier ideas of a United Baltic Duchy.

Although this was primarily a problem for the government of Prussia, the cabinet had to deal with the issue due to the danger of unauthorised action by the German army or by refugees from Posen.

Opposition from the cabinet (especially Gustav Noske), President Friedrich Ebert and Wilhelm Groener of the Army High Command at Kolberg, helped prevent a secession or a unilateral military move against Poland in the summer of 1919.

This implied a rapid dismantling of the command economy that had been created during the war years, as well as an end to capital and currency controls and to trade barriers.

[9] Matters were complicated further by a third school of thought that dominated thinking by many in the Ministry of Economic Affairs at the time, notably that of Walther Rathenau and Wichard von Moellendorff.

The concept of common economic policy combined private property rights with a strong element of central planning and a forced syndication (i.e. association) of industries organised by the state.

[9] Scheidemann's government declaration included policies such as improvements in educational standards, the establishment of a people's army, adequate provision for war widows and war-wounded servicemen, establishing the universal right of association in the constitution, acquiring new land for settlement, heavy taxation of wartime profits, and making a start to the planned improvement "of public health, protection of mothers, and care of children and young people.

"[11] In March 1919, strikes in the Ruhr, central Germany and Berlin caused the government to announce placating measures that were more in line with Wissell's views than with the liberal or socialist approaches.

[9] In May, the DDP members of the cabinet attempted to rein in the Ministry of Economic Affairs by making use of a conflict between Wissell and Schmidt concerning international trade policy.

Otherwise, the cabinet was mostly concerned with dealing with urgent short-term issues (e.g. assistance for the unemployed, veterans and the wounded or a severe lack of agricultural workers) and taking ad hoc decisions.

It was deemed unacceptable that the Germans should be barred from resisting Polish military action in Posen and in other places as long as the Allies refused to guarantee an end to hostilities on the part of the Poles.

Whilst the Foreign Minister was willing to refrain from offensive military action, he thought formal acceptance of a line-of-control to be a degrading loss of sovereignty and the new policy of the Allies in regard to Poland to be in violation of Wilson's Fourteen Points.

The cabinet decided to hand over a note of protest to the Allies, and the final version of the prolongation included some of the changes to the line-of-control requested by the German side.

The members of the delegation were changed several times and even the identity of its leader was not determined until the last moment (both Brockdorff-Rantzau and Otto Landsberg were named in drafts).

The cabinet now named the delegation that arrived in Versailles on 29 April: Brockdorff-Rantzau (chairman), Landsberg, Johannes Giesberts, plus non-cabinet members Carl Melchior, a banker, Robert Leinert [de], president of the Prussian constituent assembly and mayor of Hanover, and Walther Schücking, an expert in international law.

[12] In May, the cabinet decided to refrain from making an immediate statement in reaction to the initial Allied draft of the Peace Treaty, hoping to achieve changes through negotiations.

Since the OHL (High Command) planned to move all German troops to the east of the Elbe river should there be a resumption of hostilities, the cabinet was concerned about the actions of those states left unprotected by the strategy (Bavaria, Hesse, Baden and Württemberg).

He thus opposed the position of Prussian Minister of War Reinhardt as well as the majority of Reichswehr commanders who at a meeting on 19 June went so far as to openly threaten a revolt against the government should the Treaty be signed.

On the morning of 21 June, when the DDP finally decided not to participate in the new government, Gustav Bauer was ready to lead an SPD and Centre Party cabinet that was willing to sign.