The PLARF is the 4th branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and controls China's arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic, cruise missiles—both nuclear and conventional.

Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and American threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.

Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was a slowdown in succeeding years.

[13] In the 1970s, the nuclear weapons program saw the development of MRBM, IRBM and ICBMs and marked the beginning of a deterrent force.

By 1980, China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had successes in its strategic weapons program.

PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982.

China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets.

The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA.

In late 2009, it was reported that the Corps was constructing a 3,000–5,000-kilometre (1,900–3,100 mi) long underground launch and storage facility for nuclear missiles in the Hebei province.

[15] The DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) made its first flight test on 9 January 2014;[16] it likely entered service by October 2019.

[18] Two Chinese technical papers from December 2012 and April 2013 show that China has concluded that hypersonic weapons pose "a new aerospace threat" and that they are developing satellite directed precision guidance systems.

The U.S. Air Force has flown the X-51A Waverider technology demonstrator and the U.S. Army has flight tested the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.

[citation needed] China later confirmed the successful test flight of a "hypersonic missile delivery vehicle," but claimed it was part of a scientific experiment and not aimed at a target.

The test showed China's development of its strategic, nuclear-capable weapons as more advanced than any had thought, surprising Pentagon officials, the two newspapers said.

Neither the United States nor Russia has demonstrated the same ability, which requires launching a missile from a parent vehicle traveling five times the speed of sound.

Later that month, both Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin were officially removed from their posts, while Wang Houbin was appointed as the commander of the PLARF.

[29] On 25 September 2024 at 00:44 UTC, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s.

[32] It is currently somewhat unclear as to whether the Chinese theater commands or the PLARF itself has operational control over the conventional ballistic missile units, though it seems likely that the PLARF acts in coordination with, but not taking orders from, the theater commands with regards to the use of conventional ballistic missiles, with control of nuclear weapons continuing to be exercised at the Central Military Commission level.

[33] The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Each of the six operations bases maintains a mix of nuclear and conventional armaments specific to their geographic command's mission.

[38] Base 61 was founded in August 1965 as unit 121 in Guangyang Township of Shitai County in Anhui Province and is responsible for the construction of missile silos.

It is believed to form part of the nuclear C3 (command, control and communications) network, though it is unknown if this network is PLARF-only, shared between the PLARF and military commands, or if it used by the Central Military Commission, which is believed to have its own communication system for the nuclear forces.

[43] The main nuclear storage facility is reportedly located in Taibai County, where large-scale tunneling activities have taken place.

The main storage depot is apparently under Mount Taibai itself, with related Base 67 facilities spread throughout the rest of the county.

[43] Warhead and missile transport in China is heavily reliant on the rail and road systems, likely why a large-scale rail project was constructed in the 1960s by the PLA in the area of Baoji, a large city in Shaanxi province and the location of Base 67's headquarters since that same time period.

This would corroborate reports that PLARF communications regiments are being trained in the ability to set up telephone and command networks "on-the-fly".