The offensive resulted in the encirclement and destruction of the German forces, allowing the Soviet Army to resume its strategic advance further into Eastern Europe.

By late April, the German-Romanian allies managed to stabilize the frontline on the Carpathians-Târgu Frumos-lower Dniester alignment, and on May 6 the Stavka ordered the Soviet troops to switch to a defensive posture.

[12] Historian David Glantz however claims the Soviets made an unsuccessful attack in the same sector in an operation he refers to as the first Jassy–Kishinev offensive, from 8 April to 6 June 1944.

On the eve of the offensive, the only armoured formations left were the 1st Romanian Armored Division (with the Tiger I tank),[13][self-published source?]

The German command staff believed that the movement of Soviet forces along the front line was a result of a troop transfer to the north.

[citation needed] Army Group South Ukraine[16] – Generaloberst Johannes Friessner The 1st Romanian Armored Division did not have all of its units immediately available for opposing the Soviet offensive.

[2][21] The 2nd Ukrainian Front was to break through north of Iași, and then commit mobile formations to seize the Prut River crossings before withdrawing German units of the 6th Army could reach it.

The initial breakthrough in the 6th Army's sector was 40 km (25 mi) deep, and destroyed rear-area supply installations by the evening of 21 August.

By 23 August, the 13th Panzer Division was no longer a coherent fighting force, and the German 6th Army had been encircled to a depth of 100 km (62 mi).

The soldiers were prepared over the course of August by exercising in areas similar to those they were to attack, with emphasis on special tactics needed to overcome the enemy in their sector.

At the end of the first day, the 4th Romanian Mountain (General de divizie, (Major General) Gheorghe Manoliu), and 21st Romanian Divisions were almost completely destroyed, while the German 15th and 306th Infantry Divisions suffered heavy losses (according to a German source, the 306th Infantry lost 50% in the barrage, and was destroyed apart from local strong-points by evening).

German survivors of the initial attack stated "By the end of the barrage, Russian [Soviet] tanks were deep into our position."

It is often alleged that the speed and totality of the German collapse were caused by Romanian betrayal, for example, in Heinz Guderian's 1952 autobiography Panzer Leader.

However, Mark Axworthy states in his book that the battered 1st Armoured Division maintained cohesion, experiencing some local, costly successes before being forced to cross the Moldova River.

[23] The Soviet rates of progress imply an ineffective defense of the Romanian troops, rather than active collaboration and en-masse surrender.

[27] Hitler immediately ordered special forces under the command of Otto Skorzeny and Arthur Phleps, stationed in nearby Yugoslavia, to intervene in support of the remaining German troops, which were mostly concentrated around Bucharest, Ploiești, Brașov, and Giurgiu.

General Alfred Gerstenberg, commander of the Luftwaffe defenses around the oilfields at Ploiești, had already ordered a column of motorized troops to attack Bucharest on the evening of 23 August.

After capturing the airfield at Otopeni, the attack stalled, and by 28 August Gerstenberg and the remaining German forces in the vicinity of Bucharest surrendered.

[29] The German situation was further complicated by the loss of Brașov and the Predeal Pass, both of which were secured by the Romanian 1st Mountain Division by 25 August, thus cutting off the most direct route of reinforcement or retreat for the remaining Wehrmacht formations to the south.

The following day, the Romanian 2nd Territorial Corps captured Giurgiu and neutralized the German AA units there, taking 9,000 prisoners in the process.

[31] The 25,000-strong German presence around Ploiești, consisting mostly of flak troops and their security companies, was at first locked in a stalemate with the Romanian 5th Territorial Corps, which had a similar numerical strength.

Over the following days however, the Germans were gradually confined to the city's immediate surroundings and became heavily outnumbered as Romanian reinforcements began arriving from Bucharest and also from the east, together with lead elements of a Soviet motorized brigade.

On 30 August, an attack by the 5th Territorial Corps, now numbering over 40,000 men, reduced the Germans to a pocket around the village of Păulești, roughly 10 km (6.2 mi) north of Ploiești.

[33] Romanian sources claim that internal factors played a decisive role in Romania's switch of allegiance, while external factors only gave support; this version is markedly different from the Soviet position on the events, which holds that the offensive resulted in the Romanian coup and "liberated Romania with the help of local insurgents".

[21][35] The German formations suffered significant irrecoverable losses, with over 115,000 prisoners taken, while Soviet casualties were unusually low for an operation of this size.

[36] Romania's defection meant the loss of a vital source of oil for Germany, leading to serious fuel shortages in the Wehrmacht by the end of 1944 and prompting Hitler's first admission that the war was lost.

According to Anatol Petrencu, President of the Historians' Association of Moldova, over 170,000 Romanian soldiers were deported, 40,000 of which were incarcerated in a prisoner-of-war camp at Bălți, where many died of hunger, cold, disease, or execution.

The village of Malinovscoe, in the Rîșcani District, named in honor of the Marshal Rodion Malinovsky was dedicated to the anniversary of the end of the operation.