Sectarianism and minorities in the Syrian civil war

[2] However, the initial phases of the uprising in 2011 featured a broad, cross-sectarian opposition to the rule of Bashar al-Assad, reflecting a collective desire for political reform and social justice, transcending ethnic and religious divisions.

[4][5] Despite this, Sunni recruits faced systematic discrimination in the armed forces and ninety percentage of the officer corps were dominated by Alawite members vetted by the regime; based on their sectarian loyalty to Assad dynasty.

SAA also pursueed a truculent anti-religious policy within its ranks; marked by animosity towards Sunni religious expressions such as regular observance of salah (prayers), Hijab (headcoverings), abstinence from alcoholic drinks, etc.

[8][9] In 2011, all the religious and ethnic communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, Arab, Turkmen or Kurd were united in their uprising against Assadist rule; disenchanted with the regime's corruption, authoritarian repression, nepotism, increasing poverty, unemployment, etc.

[12] Khomeinist militants have used its influence in regime-held areas to attempt Shi'ification through forced conversions, establishment of shrines, ethnic cleansing and demographic shifts by bringing in foreign Twelver Shia settlers from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc.

Yet Assad's policy of criticising jihadism in Iraq and Palestine carried risks and "enabled previously latent ethnic and sectarian tensions to surface, Sunni groups to organize, and unsettled other sects and power clusters who had prospered under his father" Hafez al-Assad.

[22][23] In 2012, United Nations human rights investigators concluded that Syrian civil war is rapidly devolving into an "overtly sectarian" and ethnic conflict, raising the specter of reprisal killings and prolonged violence that could last for years after the government falls.

[24] The sharpest split arose between the ruling minority Alawite sect, a heterodox offshoot of Shi'ism constituting about 12% of total Syrian population, from which President Assad's most senior political elites, military officers, generals and associates are drawn; and the country's Sunni Muslim majority, mostly aligned with the opposition, the panel noted.

[8][26] Taking advantage of the existing social tensions; state media began trumpeting the sectarian card to discredit the protestors, in order to legitimise Assad's continuation and to gain critical support from those Alawites disillusioned with the regime.

[27] Despite international support, the Syrian opposition struggled in 2011-13 to unite diverse groups[28][29] and articulate clear policies on key issues like the Baath Party and public sector reform, leading to skepticism among minorities such as Alawites about a stable post-Assad future.

[39] Its alignment includes substantial military support and diplomatic backing in international forums, notably at the United Nations, where Russia has used its veto power to block resolutions that could pressure Assad to make concessions or step down.

Additionally, the Syrian government maintains a network known as the shabiha, a shadow militia that anti-government activists allege are prepared to use force, violence, weapons and racketeering, whose members primarily consist of Alawites.

In 2018, The Economist reported that most of the Syrians forcibly displaced by the Ba'athist regime belong to the Sunni community as part of a systematic sectarian cleansing campaign to re-mold the demography in favour of the Assad dynasty.

There are reports of regime plans to make Sunnis a minority within Syria in-order to consolidate its rule through the weaponization of Law no.10 and distributing vast swathes of confiscated properties to Assad loyalists and pro-Iranian militants.

[102][103][104][105] King Abdullah II of Jordan has called this scenario the "worst case" for the conflict, fearing a domino effect of fragmentation of the country along sectarian lines with consequences to the wider region.

[110][111] According to Sam Heller, Muheisini, a Saudi Arabian Salafi cleric who served as a religious judge in the rebel Army of Conquest, issued fatwa to exterminate Alawite male combatants.

[123] Since 2020, numerous Alawite figures and activists have been more outspoken in their criticism of the Assad regime, with discontent related to rising corruption, arbitrary arrests, censorship and sectarian activities of Iranian-linked militant groups in regime-held areas.

[123] According to a 2020 report published by the Arab Reform Initiative: "Many young Alawites are prioritizing their living conditions and believe that the regime is corrupt, responsible for all the successive crises that have been affecting Syrians, including youth, and incapable of finding solutions to any of them.

[185] The Uzbek group Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (Tavhid va Jihod katibasi) released a video featuring themselves and the TIP attacking and desecrating Christian Churches in Jisr al-Shughur.

The Assyrian people, mainly located in the Northeast of Syria (with the bulk of their population in neighbouring northern Iraq, and others in south east Turkey and north west Iran), are ethnically and linguistically distinct from other Syrian Christians.

[211] A controversy over the role of Turkey in the Syrian civil war also occurred due to the manner and means of which Al-Nusra Front sacked the city of Kessab, which was looked at as one of the most significant Armenian majority towns in Syria.

[226][225] By the end of the programme in 1976, Syrian government forcibly deported approximately 140,000 Kurds living in 332 villages and confiscated their lands around a 180-mile strip across the north-eastern boundary-regions of Syria with Turkey and Iraq.

[221] Where the PYD's pragmatism gave this Kurdish organization several opportunities to cooperate for its own gains, the party also received many accusations by Syrian Kurds for collaborating with the Assad regime and the PKK in exchange for power in northern Syria.

Despite the presence of high-profile Druze figures such as Gen. Issam Zahreddine in the Syrian military, who was implicated in severe human rights abuses—including the heavy shelling of civilian areas and the killing of American journalist Marie Colvin during the siege of Homs[238]— the general climate within the Druze-majority governorate has been one of refusal to participate in the conflict.

[245][252] In 2013, Israel is reportedly increasingly reaching out to the Druze of the Golan Heights with the intention of potentially creating a reliable buffer proxy force in the event Syria collapses into sectarian strife and anarchy in the near future.

[264] The renewed vigor in these protests signified a major political awakening among the Druze, echoing through the region as a call to resist not just the Syrian regime but also external influences perceived as threatening their autonomy.

[272] In December 2012, Syrian rebel forces burned the Shia 'Husseiniya' mosque in the northern town of Jisr al-Shughur, inciting fears that the salafist groups would wage an all out war against Syria's minority religions.

[278] The Ismaili community has been known to be peaceful and aimed at not engaging in any form of sectarianism and avoiding national conflict, perhaps under the spiritual guidance of its cultured Imam abroad, his Highness the Aga Khan IV.

[279] During 2013 and 2014, many holy shrines and tombs in the eastern Syrian province of Deir al-Zor affiliated with Sufism were destroyed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant which have been among the group's main targets.

A lot of ethnic Chechens, not just from Syria but also traveled from Russia and Europe, have formed and participated under various groups, the Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, the Caucasus Emirate (Syrian branch), Junud al-Sham and Ajnad al-Kavkaz.