[8] The security dilemma is a key concept in international relations theory, in particular among realist scholars to explain how security-seeking states can end up in conflict.
According to Kenneth Waltz, because the world does not have a common government and is "anarchic", survival is the main motivation of states.
[10] The security dilemma explains why security-seeking (as opposed to non-security seeking) states could end up in conflict, even though they have benign intentions.
They share the basic beliefs of survivalism, statism (state as the primary unit), self-help and anarchy.
[14] According to Mearsheimer, though achieving hegemony by any state is not likely in today's international system, there is no such thing as a status quo and "the world is condemned to perpetual great power competition".
He argues that at a strategic level, technical and geographical factors are of greater favor to the defender.
In particular, under given circumstances of the security dilemma, what steps might a threatened state take to derive advantage by attacking first.
[17] Jervis claims that the security dilemma can lead to arms races and alliance formation.
According to Robert Jervis, since the world is anarchic, a state might, for defensive purposes, build its military capability.
Competition on nuclear weapons construction between the United States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, is a well-known example of an arms race.
According to Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, in a multipolar world two types of alliance dilemma exist which are contrary in nature.
For example, to use Waltz's example, in World War II, the French Foreign Minister told the British Prime Minister that Britain was justified in taking "the lead in opposing Germany" when the Nazis had taken over the Rhineland, but as "the German threat grew", France and Britain hoped that Germany and the Soviet Union "would balance each other off or fight to the finish.
[20] According to Alexander Wendt, "Security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature" but, rather, are "a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other's intentions".
"Wendt is using the security dilemma to describe the result of states' interaction whereas Jervis and the literature he has spawned use the security dilemma to refer to a situation created by the material conditions facing states, such as geography and prevailing technology".
[23] Another mode of criticism of the security dilemma concept is to question the validity of the offence-defense balance.
As a result, critics have questioned whether the offense-defense balance can be used as a variable in explaining international conflicts.
Offense-defense theory assumes that both parties in conflict will use those weapons that suit their strategy and goals.
Second, whether both states involved in the conflict have some common weapons between them is the wrong question to ask in seeking to understand the offense-defense balance.