During the Second World War he rose to be Deputy Chief of Staff of Second Army, playing an important role in planning sea transport to the Normandy beachhead and reaching the acting rank of brigadier.

In this job he set up the NEDC, but became an increasingly unpopular figure because of the contractionary measures which he felt compelled to take, including the "Pay Pause" of July 1961, culminating in the sensational Liberal victory at the Orpington by-election in March 1962.

[15] During the General Strike of May 1926, Lloyd, who earlier that year had begun eating dinners at Gray's Inn with a view to qualifying as a barrister, volunteered as a Special Constable.

[5] He seldom spoke about Belsen, but later recalled seeing inmates living like animals, defecating in public view, and that there was no smell from the 10,000 corpses lying unburied (another 17,000 died after liberation) as they were emaciated, with no flesh to putrefy.

Lloyd helped to negotiate the treaty (12 February 1953) which gave Sudan (in theory jointly administered by Britain and Egypt) self-government for three years as a stepping-stone to a decision on full independence.

[62] Eden and Lloyd visited Washington for talks with his American counterpart, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on 30 January 1956, and wondered how long Britain could continue to cooperate with Colonel Nasser.

[75] In New York Lloyd attended the United Nations Security Council meeting, where he met Christian Pineau and Dr Fawzi, the French and Egyptian foreign ministers.

Eden was worried that the UK might have to come to Jordan's defence in the event of a Middle Eastern War (Palestinian guerrillas were operating against Israel from the West Bank, which would be under Jordanian control until 1967).

[100] At Cabinet on the morning of 30 October Lloyd reported that the US was ready to move a motion at the UN condemning Israel as an aggressor, and proposed a delay in order to bring the Americans on board.

There was a second meeting of the Egypt Committee at 3.30pm, at which Lloyd passed on the warning of the British Ambassador to Iraq that Britain had to condemn Israeli aggression in order to preserve her status in Arab eyes.

Royal Marines had been landing by sea and helicopter on 6 November, and British and French forces had Port Said and had advanced 23 miles to El Cap by the time a ceasefire was announced at 5pm.

[115] In Washington Lloyd managed to speak to Eisenhower's adviser Walter Bedell Smith, and addressed the UN General Assembly on Friday 23 November, the day Eden left for Jamaica.

In a speech which was essentially an acceptance of an Argentinian motion, Lloyd offered to hand over to a UN peacekeeping force and claimed that Britain had prevented a small war growing into a larger one.

[117] Throughout November and into early December Lloyd was strongly attacked in the House of Commons both by Labour as a scapegoat for the original invasion and by Conservative backbenchers for the enforced withdrawal.

[130] Whilst in Bermuda Macmillan, after consultation with Lloyd, agreed to release Archbishop Makarios, who had been exiled to the Seychelles in March 1956, after being advised that this might calm EOKA down.

[136] On Monday 14 July 1958 Macmillan was at Birch Grove, and recorded that Lloyd "almost shouted down the line" about the revolution in Iraq, warning that Jordan and Syria might also fall to Nasser.

[138] In December 1958 at a NATO Ministerial Council Lloyd negotiated the concept of "sovereign bases" in Cyprus, where the Governor was his old Cambridge contemporary Hugh Foot, with the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers.

[141] At Moscow Ambassador Sir Patrick Reilly wrote that he was "quite first class and they make an admirable team" and "the ideal second", keeping his boss supplied with facts and figures and willingly undertaking tedious detailed negotiations.

[143][141] Lloyd was the leader at the Foreign Ministers' conference in Geneva in June 1959 (with Christian Herter, Maurice Couve de Murville and Andrei Gromyko) and kept it going, allowing Eisenhower to issue his invitation to Khrushchev to visit Washington in August.

Whilst the conference had been in progress a false story had appeared in "The Times", fanned by Randolph Churchill and to Macmillan's apparent annoyance, that Lloyd was to be moved from the Foreign Office.

Furthermore, the balance of payments was moving into deficit, with Britain's share of world manufacturing falling dramatically as continental Europe, now grouped into the EEC, recovered from the effects of the war.

Another measure, effectively a second Regulator (brought in over the objections of John Boyd-Carpenter, Minister of Pensions and National Insurance) allowed the Chancellor to increase Employers' NICs by up to 4 shillings per week.

[169] Henry Brooke was appointed to the new position of Chief Secretary to the Treasury in October 1961 so Lloyd did not have to spend all his time arguing with Cabinet colleagues about their planned level of expenditure.

Lloyd presented a White Paper on Incomes Policies, urging an official "Guiding Light" of 2.5%, a rate which the government expected pay to be increased by companies and tribunals.

[81] On 14 February 1962, over whisky at 10 Downing Street, Macmillan persuaded the railway union bosses to call off their planned strike, an achievement trumpeted by the press as "Mac's Triumph".

[178] Macmillan, disingenuously, as he had already decided to sack him, wrote to Lloyd on 11 April congratulating him and asking him to begin preparing an expansionary budget for 1963 to help the Conservatives win re-election.

Next morning, 13 July, Macmillan carried out the rest of his changes after hearing, from Lord Home, that Lloyd had tried in vain to get John Hare, Minister of Labour, to resign in protest.

He was cheered to the echo when he reentered the Commons Chamber after his sacking, whereas Macmillan entered in silence from his own party and jeers from the Opposition, and was subjected to public criticism (then almost unprecedented) from his predecessor Lord Avon.

Macmillan wanted the "open air cure" (i.e. public moral pressure to discourage inflationary wage rises), so it is hard to see how Lloyd could have urged anything stronger.

Thorpe dismisses this as "wishful thinking", arguing that Lloyd was not even in the same league as Joseph Chamberlain or Rab Butler, politicians who were – in different ways – of first-rank importance despite not becoming prime minister.