[5] To escape the invaders' encirclement, on November 23, 1915, the government and supreme command made the joint decision to retreat across the mountains of Montenegro and Albania.

Between November 1915 and January 1916, during the journey across the mountains, 77,455 soldiers and 160,000 civilians froze, starved to death, died of disease, or were killed by enemy raids.

'[6] Out of the 400,000 people who set out on the journey, only 120,000 soldiers and 60,000 civilians reached the Adriatic coast to be evacuated by Allied ships to the island of Corfu, where a Serbian government-in-exile headed by Prince-Regent Alexander and Nikola Pašić was established.

[9] Despite initial setbacks, the Serbs, under General Radomir Putnik's command, used the terrain and strategic advantages to secure a decisive victory at the Battle of Cer.

[10] A third invasion launched in October 1914, resulted in the capture of Belgrade on 2 December 1914 before a successful Serbian counter-offensive at the Battle of Kolubara expelled the Central Powers forces from Serbia before the end of the month, concluding the campaign.

[11] After being humiliated by "the peasant regiments of a small Balkan kingdom",[12] the blow to Habsburg prestige was "incalculable" and Franz Ferdinand's avenging remained unfulfilled.

[20][20] By mid-November, Serbian forces had reached Pristina ahead of their pursuers but were unable to break south due to the Bulgarian Second Army's blockade at Kačanik Pass.

[15] The Central Powers, led by Field Marshal August von Mackensen, aimed to trap the Serbian army in Kosovo and force a final, decisive battle.

The only available route for retreat led southwest and northwest, across the Korab and Prokletije mountain ranges in Albania and Montenegro, part of the Dinaric Alps, where elevations exceeded 6,000 feet (1,800 m) and harsh winter conditionshad already set in.

The Serbian government, led by Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, Prince Regent Alexander, and the Supreme Command under Field Marshal Radomir Putnik, ordered a general withdrawal.

[18] With no remaining strongholds, the Serbian High Command issued an official retreat order on 25 November 1915, instructing all units to withdraw toward the Adriatic coast.

[30] King Peter I, despite his advanced age and frail health, insisted on accompanying the retreating army, traveling through the rugged terrain in an ox cart.

[31] Severe winter conditions and rugged terrain proved insurmountable for the Austro-Hungarian Tenth Mountain Brigade as it attempted to continue its advance south from Ribarić.

Faced with increasing logistical challenges and worsening conditions, Mackensen decided to abandon the pursuit on 24 November 1915, marking the end of the campaign.

[32] With their pursuers no longer an immediate threat, the Serbian army and tens of thousands of civilians continued their retreat along three separate routes, converging at Lake Scutari on the Albanian-Montenegrin border before heading toward the Adriatic coast.

[37] The brutal actions of Serbian and Montenegrin troops during the First Balkan War had left lasting resentment among many Albanians, prompting some to retaliate against retreating soldiers, contributing to ongoing cycles of violence and retribution.

Refugees and soldiers alike now faced the most difficult part of the journey,crossing the snow-covered mountain passes of Montenegro and Albania in the depths of winter.

[39] The Northern Column, consisting of the First, Second, and Third Armies, as well as units from the Defence of Belgrade, took the route through southern Montenegro, passing through Peć to Scutari (Shkodër), via Rožaje, Andrijevica and Podgorica.

The officers of the Supreme Command who accompanied the Chief of the General Staff Radomir Putnik took longer, leaving on 26 November and arriving in Shkodër on 6 December.

[47] As early as 20 November 1915, Prime Minister Pašić sent an urgent appeal to the Allies, requesting food and supplies to be delivered to Adriatic ports for the Serbian army and civilians.

Refugees arriving in San Giovanni di Medua (Shëngjin) found the wrecks of Italian vessels which had been destroyed by mines before unloading.

[50] Food shipments from France and Britain, intended for Serbian troops, were stalled in Brindisi, Italy, as fears of Austrian naval attacks delayed transport [51] The Austro-Hungarian Navy intensified its operations, targeting Allied supply lines.

On 22 November, Austrian destroyers sank the Italian steamers Palatino and Gallinara, en route from Brindisi to San Giovanni di Medua and Durrës.

The Serbian government-in-exile convened emergency meetings to manage the situation, forming a special cabinet for nutrition to coordinate food purchases and ration distribution.

Military bakeries were reopened, but production was insufficient to meet demand, and cases of soldiers dying from exhaustion and starvation continued to be reported.

[54] The Duke of Abruzzi and Vice Admiral Emanuele Cutinelli Rendina, commander of Italian naval forces in the southern Adriatic, were responsible for planning sea evacuations from Albania.

The Serbian envoy in Rome accused the Italian authorities of deliberately downplaying the scale of the refugee crisis to justify limited assistance.

[55] Royal Navy Admiral Ernest Troubridge oversaw evacuation efforts from San Giovanni di Medua, converting the port into an improvised embarkation point for Serbian troops and refugees.

[68] Despite the enormous human toll of the retreat, the reconstituted Serbian army played a decisive role in the final Allied offensives, significantly contributing to the breakthrough on the Macedonian front and the liberation of Serbia.

[7] As one historian described it, the retreat was not remembered as a military triumph but as a "motley, pitiful spectacle of the bez̄anija[a]" where countless refugees struggled to survive amid immense suffering and chaos.