Guzzoni's defence plan was for the coastal formations to form a screen to receive the invasion and allow time for the field divisions further back to intervene.

[32] At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, with the end of the North African Campaign in sight, the political leaders and the military Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Britain met to discuss future strategy.

[33] At first, the Americans opposed the plan as opportunistic and irrelevant, but were persuaded to agree to a Sicilian invasion on the grounds of the great savings to Allied shipping that would result from the opening of the Mediterranean by the removal of Axis air and naval forces from the island.

[34] The outline plan given to Eisenhower by the Chiefs of Staff involved dispersed landings by brigade and division-sized formations in the south-east, south and north-west areas of the island.

[36] Tedder and Cunningham opposed Montgomery's plan because it would leave 13 landing grounds in Axis hands, posing a considerable threat to the Allied invasion fleet.

[37] After Alexander joined the meeting on 3 May, Montgomery's proposals were finally accepted on the basis that it was better to take an administrative risk (having to support troops by landing supplies across beaches) than an operational one (dispersion of effort).

[40] In the event, maintaining the armies by landing supplies across the beaches proved easier than expected, partly because of the successful introduction of large numbers of the new amphibious DUKW vehicle.

He later wrote that at that stage it was not practicable to plan further ahead but that his intentions were clear in his own mind what the next step would be: he would drive north ultimately to Santo Stefano on the northern coast to split the island in two and cut his enemy's east–west communications.

[43] From 3 July, bombing concentrated on Sicilian airfields and Axis communications with Italy, although beach defences were left alone, to preserve surprise as to where the landings would occur.

A platoon of the 2nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment, under Lieutenant Louis Withers, part of the British 1st Airlanding Brigade, landed on target, captured Ponte Grande and repulsed counterattacks.

[61][62] Despite these mishaps, the widespread landing of airborne troops, both American and British, had a positive effect as small isolated units, acting on their initiative, attacked vital points and created confusion.

This constituted the largest amphibious operation of World War II in terms of size of the landing zone and the number of divisions put ashore on the first day.

[b] Gruppo Tattico Carmito (under Lieutenant-Colonel Francesco Tropea), tasked with defending Malati Bridge, defeated a Royal Marines Commando Battalion on 13 July with the help of the local middle-age reservists.

[75] In Major General Terry Allen's U.S. 1st Infantry Division sector at Gela, there was an Italian division-sized counterattack where the dispersed 505th Parachute Regimental Combat Team was supposed to have been.

By the evening of 10 July, the seven Allied assault divisions—three American, three British and one Canadian—were well established ashore, the port of Syracuse had been captured, and fears of an Axis air onslaught had proved unfounded.

Italian Stukas sank the destroyer USS Maddox[d][e] and Re.2002s[83] sunk the Indian hospital ship Talamba with heavy loss of life,[f][84] and in the following days Axis aircraft damaged or sank several more warships, transport vessels and landing craft starting with the Allied troopship USS Barnett hit and damaged by an Italian bomber formation on the morning of 11 July.

3 Commando captured Malati Bridge on 13 July, only to lose possession of it when the 4th Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Francesco Tropea) and the Italian 553rd and 554th Motorcycle Companies counter-attacked.

[55] The 144 Douglas C-47 transports arrived at the same time as an Axis air raid; the first echelon of troop carrying planes had dropped their loads without interference, when an Allied naval vessel fired on the formation.

[107] Once the beachheads were secure, Alexander planned to split the island in half by thrusting north through the Caltanissetta and Enna region, to deny the defenders the central east–west lateral road.

[113] On 12 July, the British 1st Parachute Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Gerald Lathbury, had been dropped in Operation Fustian, an attempt to capture the Primosole Bridge over the river Simeto, on the southern edge of the Catania plain.

The initial counterattacks were Italian in the form of reinforcements from the 10th Arditi Paratroop Regiment (Major Vito Marciano),[73] reservists from the 372nd Coastal Battalion[l] (Major Nino Bolla[m]) and gunners from the 29th Artillery Group[n] fighting in the infantry role and an armoured car squadron that nearly overran the headquarters of 9th Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry, at nightfall in the first day of the battle for Primosole Bridge.

On the night of 17 July, the Italian cruiser Scipione Africano, equipped with EC.3 Gufo radar, detected and engaged four British Elco motor torpedo boats lurking eight kilometres (5 mi) away, while passing the Strait of Messina at high speed.

[122] On the left flank, the 1st Canadian Division continued to advance but it was becoming clear that, as German units settled into their new positions in north eastern Sicily, the army would not have sufficient strength to carry the whole front and the Canadians were ordered to continue north to Leonforte and then turn eastward to Adrano on the south-western slopes of Mount Etna, instead of an encirclement of Mount Etna using Route 120 to Randazzo.

The American advance toward Agrigento was temporarily held up by the 207th Coastal Defence Division (under Colonel Augusto De Laurentis) that was at Sant'Oliva Station, ten kilometres (6 mi) inland from Licata.

The defenders' left flank was also becoming exposed as the adjacent Hermann Göring Division was pushed back by the British XXX Corps and they were ordered to withdraw that night in phases to the defensive positions of the Tortorici Line.

[139] However, when Hube suggested on 4 August that a start should be made by transferring superfluous men and equipment, Guzzoni refused to sanction the idea without the approval of the Comando Supremo.

During this period, Hube ordered successive withdrawals each night of between 8 and 24 kilometres (5 and 15 mi), keeping the following Allied units at arm's length with the use of mines, demolitions and other obstacles.

[q] The resulting overlapping gunfire from both sides of the strait was described by Allied pilots as worse than the Ruhr, making daylight air attacks highly hazardous and generally unsuccessful.

[151] In 2004, Tomblin wrote that the Italians evacuated 62,182 men, 41 guns and 227 vehicles with the loss of only one motor raft and the train ferry Cariddi, which was scuttled when Allied troops entered Messina.

Troops from the 180th Infantry Regiment committed another massacre on 14 July, when Captain John T. Compton ordered 35 Italian POWs to be summarily executed by firing squad.