The rebellion, located in the east of the country, was led by the followers of Patrice Lumumba, who had been ousted from power in 1960 by Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Joseph-Désiré Mobutu and subsequently killed in January 1961 in Katanga.

The causes of the Simba Rebellion should be viewed as part of the wider struggle for power within the Republic of the Congo following independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960 as well as within the context of other Cold War interventions in Africa by the West and the Soviet Union.

Political infighting and intrigue followed, resulting in the ascendancy of Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Joseph-Désiré Mobutu in Kinshasa at the expense of politicians who had supported Lumumba such as Antoine Gizenga, Christophe Gbenye, and Gaston Soumialot.

[15] However, whilst these plans for rebellion were being developed in exile, Pierre Mulele returned from his training in China to launch a revolution in his native province of Kwilu in 1963.

Whilst the leaders claimed to be influenced by Chinese Maoist ideas, the Cuban military advisor Che Guevara wrote that the majority of the fighters did not hold these views.

Frustrated that Congolese authorities hampered their activities and radicalised by their repeated failures, Inyenzi based in the Congo joined the Simba rebellion because they hoped that a Simba-led government would support their own efforts in Rwanda.

[22] Rwandan exiles held prominent positions within the rebel hierarchy, with Inyenzi leaders Louis Bidalira and Jerome Katarebe serving as chief of staff and chef de cabinet respectively.

[25] Pro-Simba forces successfully revolted in the important harbor town of Albertville in late May, capturing Jason Sendwe, President of North Katanga Province.

The government forces fled,[26][25] leaving Sendwe behind; he was subsequently murdered by either Simba rebels[26] or, less likely, ANC soldiers, though the circumstances remain unclear and disputed.

[28] The local Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) garrisons reacted with brutal counter-insurgency actions that failed to defeat the Simbas, but alienated the population of the eastern provinces.

Utterly demoralized by repeated defeats, many ANC soldiers believed that the Simba rebels had become invincible thanks to magical rituals performed by insurgent shamans.

The U.S. and Belgian leadership believed that Tshombe was supportive of their interests as well as a more effective leader, thereby being the ideal person to lead the Congo in the conflict against the Simba rebels.

He asked the Western nations for military assistance, recruited White mercenaries, and brought his exiled loyalist troops (the Katangese Gendarmerie) back into the country.

Some Ugandan troops served alongside the rebels in combat,[3] and the Congolese ANC and the Uganda Army's 1st Battalion directly clashed along the border of the two countries at some point in 1964.

[36] Other countries which sent covert military support through weapons shipments and training included Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Algeria under Ahmed Ben Bella.

China also provided limited aid to the rebels, with Chinese experts based in the Congo, Burundi, and Tanzania suspected of training Simba insurgents.

Thousands of Congolese were executed in systematic purges by the Simbas, including government officials, political leaders of opposition parties, provincial and local police, school teachers, and others believed to have been Westernized.

Even though the vast majority of Rwandans in the Congo were uninvolved in the uprising and living peacefully, they were consequently the target of ethnic violence and blamed "for all sorts of evil" by Congolese authorities.

[41] In addition the force was accompanied by Jerry Puren and a score of mercenary pilots flying Second World War surplus training planes fitted with machine guns.

Two hundred mercenaries from France, South Africa, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Angola arrived in Katanga Province over the next month.

Once captured, Albertville would give the ANC access to Lake Tanganyika and serve as a staging base for future offensives to relieve Government enclaves in the North.

The move made good progress but was diverted when it ran across a Catholic priest who convinced the mercenaries to rescue 60 clergy being held by Simba troops.

[52] Though the initial ground attacks met with some success, the Simbas still managed to offer significant resistance, and even retook some areas amid counter-attacks soon after the campaign's beginning.

[63] Meanwhile, their international supporters continued to arm and train the rebels, although Burundi expelled local Chinese experts who had possibly aided the insurgency around early February.

[37] From March to June 1965, ANC contingents and mercenaries under Hoare and Jacques Noel organized Operations "White Giant" and "Violettes Imperiales", military offensives aimed at retaking the areas bordering Uganda, Sudan, and the Central African Republic.

These operations cut off important rebel supply routes, recaptured a number of strategically significant towns in northern Orientale Province, and deprived the insurgents of local gold mines.

The "Rwandese Popular Movement" and the "Rwanda Youth National Union" led by Jean Kayitare, son of Rwandan exile leader François Rukeba, each mobilized a battalion to assist the beleaguered Simbas.

Accordingly, the memory of the Banyamulenge-Simba fighting became ethnically charged, a development which was further fuelled by the Banyamulenge exploiting their victory over the rebels by expanding their holdings in South Kivu after the rebellion.

Marked by a unique blend of Cuban and Congolese cultures, this community spread beyond Cuba, as some Cuban-Congolese ultimately returned to Africa or relocated to other parts of the world.

Despite being relatively small, the community has played a major part in modern Congolese politics due to the influence of Cuba-based ex-Simbas on the first post-Mobutu government of the Congo.