The third invasion (1767–1768) led by the elite Manchu Bannermen nearly succeeded, penetrating deep into central Burma within a few days' march from the capital, Ava (Inwa).

[15] But the bannermen of northern China could not cope with unfamiliar tropical terrains and lethal endemic diseases, and were driven back with heavy losses.

Twenty years later, when Burma and China resumed a diplomatic relationship in 1790, the Qing unilaterally viewed the act as Burmese submission, and claimed victory.

[21] While the Qing were consolidating their hold at the border, the Toungoo dynasty was faced with multiple external raids and internal rebellions and could not take any reciprocal action.

In 1752, the Emperor issued a manuscript, Qing Imperial Illustration of Tributaries, saying that all "barbarian" tribes under his rule must be studied and reported their natures and cultures back to Beijing.

Three of the ten farther Shan state sawbwas (Mogaung, Bhamo, Hsenwi) and their militias reportedly ran away into Yunnan and tried to persuade Qing officials to invade Burma.

Instead of complying, Liu committed suicide by slicing his throat with a stationery knife, writing as blood was pouring from his neck: "There is no way to pay back the emperor's favor.

While this kind of suicide in the face of bureaucratic failure apparently was not unusual in Qing China, it reportedly enraged the Emperor nonetheless.

[23] Unlike the invasion of Liu Zao in Kengtung, which was located far away from the Burmese heartland, Yang was determined to strike Upper Burma directly.

To reinforce them, another army led by Maha Thiha Thura and posted at the easternmost Burmese garrison at Kenghung (present-day Jinghong, Yunnan), was ordered to march to the Bhamo theater across the northern Shan states.

One Qing report stated that 800 out of 1,000 soldiers in one garrison had died of disease, and that another 100 were ill.[23] With the Chinese army greatly weakened, the Burmese then launched their offensive.

[28] Maha Sithu's army which had been guarding the western flank of the Irrawaddy River, then marched north of Myitkyina and defeated other lightly held Chinese garrisons at the border.

He reported that Bhamo had been occupied; that its inhabitants had begun wearing Manchu-style pigtails; and that the Burmese commander, Ne Myo Sithu, after losing 10,000 men had sued for peace.

[14] In 1767, the Emperor appointed the veteran Manchu commander Ming Rui, a son-in-law of his, as governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, and head of the Burma campaign.

[8] The Qing court now seriously considered the threat of illnesses among its troops; as a precaution, the campaign was planned for the winter months when diseases were believed to be less prevalent.

[30] Having smashed through the main Burmese army, Ming Rui pressed on full-steam ahead, overrunning one town after another, and reached Singu on the Irrawaddy River, 30 miles north of Ava at the beginning of 1768.

The only bright spot for the Burmese was that the northern invasion force, which was to come down the Irrawaddy to join up with Ming Rui's main army, had been held off at Kaungton.

The Burmese guerrilla attacks on the long supply lines across the jungles of the Shan Hills were seriously hampering the Qing army's ability to proceed.

Bolstered by the reinforcements, two Burmese armies led by Maha Thiha Thura and Ne Myo Sithu succeeded in retaking Hsenwi.

[34] Thousands of Bannermen from the freezing grasslands along the Russian border, began dying of malaria as well as Burmese attacks in the furnace-like hot weather of central Burma.

Through careful maneuvering, the Burmese managed to achieve complete encirclement of the Chinese at modern-day Pyin Oo Lwin (Maymyo), about 50 miles northeast of Ava.

He studied past Ming and Mongol expeditions to form his battle plan, which called for a three-pronged invasion via Bhamo and the Irrawaddy River.

The twin invading armies on each side of the river would be accompanied by war boats manned by thousands of sailors from the Fujian navy.

[10] The Burmese defenses now included French musketeers and gunners under the command of Pierre de Milard, governor of Tabe, who had arrived back from the Siamese theater.

But Maha Thiha Thura, who oversaw the annihilation of Ming Rui's army at the Battle of Maymyo in 1768, realized that another wipe-out would merely stiffen the resolve of the Chinese government.

Two days later, as the Burmese stood to arms and looked down, starved Chinese soldiers marched sullenly away up the Taping River valley; they began to perish of hunger by thousands in the passes.

The Qing had lost some of the generation's most important frontier experts, including Yang Yingju, Ming Rui, Aligun, and Fuheng (who eventually died of malaria in 1770).

The high casualties of the war (in terms of the population size) and the ongoing need to guard the northern border seriously hampered the Burmese military's capability to renew warfare in Siam.

[45] A historian of Chinese military history, Marvin Whiting, writes that the Burmese success probably saved the independence of other states in Southeast Asia.

Historian Victor Lieberman writes: "These near simultaneous victories over Siam (1767) and China (1765–1769) testified to a truly astonishing elan unmatched since Bayinnaung.