Small power

Even though small state administrations lack the resources of their larger counterparts, their informality, flexibility, and the autonomy of their diplomats can prove advantageous in negotiations and within institutional settings.

For, as László Réczei noted, power status hinges on the capacity for violence: "If the notion of war were unknown in international relations, the definition of ‘small power’ would have no significance; just as in the domestic life of a nation it has no significance whether a man is less tall or has a weaker physique than his fellow citizen.

[6] The weakening of the non-alignment movement during the 1970s coincided with a gradual decline in small-state studies, culminating in Peter Baehr's critical appraisal of the research tradition in which he questioned smallness as a useful framework for analysis.

The small-power category was first taken into serious account with David Mitrany's study on world government (pax oecumenica) in 1933.

Alesina and Spolaore state that if there were only benefits from size, then the tendency should be for the entire world to be organized in a single country.

To find a balanced conclusion, we need to discern quantitative and qualitative approaches to analyze and define a small state.

As a matter of fact, smallness and greatness can evolve in time and as Vital points out all states possess aspects of strength and weakness.

Historically times of war have led to state consolidation due to the cost and benefits of a centralized military.

From the 14th to 17th century European city-states were unified around politics and economics and had many of the characteristics of modern small, democratic countries.

The inherent geographical constraint on England is partially credited with the effective development of a sustainable state in the late 16th and 17th centuries, rather than a conquest driven effort of territorial acquisition.

[16] Although not perfect, it remains useful now despite its age, to capture the different approaches used when small states are identified: "One axis considers whether the factors involved are endogenous or exogenous: that is to say, whether the smallness lies in the internal aspects of a country itself (such as its population or Gross Domestic Product [GDP]) or in its relations with other states (such as the size of its armed forces or its alliance status).

Using that reasoning, IR-theorists tend to believe that the foreign-policy of small states is more greatly influenced by the international system rather than their domestic politics.

Generally speaking, great powers are faced with a lower level of external threat in comparison to small states and thus have more options for action.

This increased range of choice will tend to make foreign policy formation more susceptible to domestic political influences.

'1 Since great powers 'enjoy a substantial buffer from the pressures of international competition', domestic political explanations are good predictors of their foreign policy strategies.

Whereas 'great powers adapt their foreign strategies to their domestic circumstances', small states are more 'exposed to the vagaries of international security and economic competition'.

Since small state foreign policy strategies will reflect an attentiveness to external exigencies, international/structural explanations should suffice.

Baldur Thorhallsson and Alyson J. K. Bailes take the shelter theory even further and talk about how small states have three vulnerabilities, political, economic and societal.

Small states are at a disadvantage in the UN Security Council (UNSC) due to economic, administrative and military weaknesses.

International institutions can decrease the price of cooperation, facilitate information sharing and provide a venue for relationship building.

[24] Though a single definition has proved elusive due to the number of potential variables and their particular interpretation under given conditions, Asle Toje claims to have found recurring traits in the research literature regarding the behavioural patterns of small powers on the international stage:[25] Small states can under some circumstances have a disproportionately great influence.

According to Diana Panke, "Small states tend to be most likely to punch above their weight if the negotiations take place in an institutionalised arena with majority-based decision-making rules in which each state has one vote or in contexts in which decisions are made unanimously, if they are selective in negotiations and concentrate their capacities on the most important issues, engage in capacity-building activities to maximise their ideational resources, if they make use of institutional opportunity structures such as chairing meetings and engaging in agenda-setting, and if they individually or collectively apply persuasion strategies from early on".

Coalitions have burden-sharing effects and can increase the discursive leverage of its members Secondly small states can also use shaping strategies.

Framing and reframing is for example important for small states if there is a high number of delegations participating in the negotiations.

The Nordic states of Denmark, Sweden and Finland have sought shelter in the European Union while the remaining others, Iceland and Norway, do not.

The five Nordic states have differences that are important to their industrial structures as Lars Mjoset, a Norwegian political economist, pointed out.

The Swedish industry had been international for a long time but after moving a lot of their operations into the European markets the businesses managed to convince the government it was in the national interest to follow their example.

Such active, well coordinated deep integration outside Sweden was only seen in Finland who embraced the EC into the roots of society (ibid, pp. 143–144).

International status seeking cannot be separated from domestic legitimation, especially with small states that are integrated in global politics.

Small states may opt for a collective strategy of mobility into the middle power rank by taking on extended responsibilities for preserving international order.