Somali National Alliance
The Somali National Alliance (abbreviated SNA) was a major politico-military faction formed on 16 June 1992 by four different rebel groups that had been in opposition to the regime of former President Mohamed Siad Barre.
Formed in 1987, the United Somali Congress (USC) led by Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid, played a leading role in toppling the government in Mogadishu in January 1991.
[6] According to SNA accounts of the final clashes, SNF forces outnumbered the Somali Liberation Army coalition over six times, but were ambushed and encircled when they left their base in Baidoa and came within 50km from Mogadishu.
[17] Mohammed Farah Aidid was be elected to serve as the first chairman and nominal leader of the SNA on 10 August 1992,[4] but his ability to impose decisions on the organization was limited, as a council of elders held decision-making power for most significant issues.
[21] In late July 1992 the alliance announced that they were creating a "joint administrative body" to make security arrangements in order to reduce banditry and that they further rejected recent proposals to send 500 UN troops to Somalia.
Instead they appealed to the UN to aid the creation of a 6,000 man strong police service to maintain security and Aidid announced that he agreed with the deployment of 40 UN military observers to Mogadishu.
To the surprise of both the SNA and UN Special Representative Mohammed Sahnoun, Secretary-General Boutros Ghali announced in a 24 August report his intention to increase the size of UNOSOM from 500 to 3,500 and deploy the extra troops in four operational zones across the country.
[27] The large scale international military intervention in late 1992 mobilized nationalist opposition to foreign troops in Somalia, which contributed to a significant growth of support for the SNA, which loudly decried perceived UN colonial practices.
[28] John Drysdale, a prominent advisor hired by the UN for the operation, warned UNOSOM officials that Somalis would widely see a military deployment as gumeysi (foreign oppression) if it was perceived to be made without their sanction.
[30] Mohamed Farah Aidid, leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), initially welcomed the operation, reportedly at the urging of his lieutenant Osman Atto, who had close ties to U.S. embassy officials in Nairobi and the American oil company Conoco.
[38] The contention between the Somali National Alliance and UNOSOM from this point forward began to manifest in anti-UNOSOM propaganda broadcast from SNA controlled Radio Mogadishu.
The raid has been noted for turning popular sentiment firmly against the intervention to the extent where, "...even forces loyal to Ali Mahdi began to display open contempt for UNOSOM II.
The chosen method to confront UNOSOM II was coercive pain infliction; by killing UN soldiers, the SNA aimed to impose cumulative costs on the UN, which would eventually compel a withdrawal.
General Ed Wheeler noted that during the conflict Gen. Aidid (a graduate of Russia's Frunze Military Academy) lectured his subordinate officers about the lessons of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War.
[47] In the view former professor of strategic studies and NSC director Jonathan Stevenson,[48] the Americans failed to realize that the SNA was deliberately executing a military philosophy of attrition to achieve victory in spite of significant losses, much like the North Vietnamese guerrillas.
[52] In September 1993, the major Arab newspaper Al-Hayat reported that numerous Islamic factions had joined the fight alongside the SNA after having initially distanced themselves from the war.
According to Al-Hayat, independent sources in Mogadishu had confirmed that the majority of night military operations were being organized by an assortment of Somali Islamic groups present in the city during 1993.
Despite appearing poorly equipped and lacking discipline by American standards, many of the fighters had accrued years of combat experience while also demonstrating both determination and courage in numerous engagements with UNOSOM II well before the Battle of Mogadishu.
SNA ambushes on convoys were noted to be frequently initiated with premature fire at the lead UN vehicle, alerting the rest of the column to the attack before entering the kill zone.
Significant amounts of SNA heavy weapons and armoured vehicles seized by the UN were discovered to be inoperable or in poor condition due to substandard maintenance and lack of parts.
He furthers notes that among the most notable of these sustained engagements in Mogadishu were:[59] Significantly outgunned by UNOSOM II and Task Force Ranger, the militia resorted to innovative tactics that exposed US military weaknesses which were later heavily exploited by the Iraqi insurgency.
[64] Two days after the Battle of Mogadishu, on 6 October 1993, President Bill Clinton ordered all US military forces in Somalia to cease actions against the Somali National Alliance, except in self defence.
Despite the "wanton destruction and suffering beyond human comprehension" inflicted by US and UN forces, the alliance urged respect towards the deceased, injured, and prisoners of war; in accordance with Islamic principles.
[71] Professor Mohamed Siad Issa, an SNA official, remarked in an interview with Dutch newspaper Algemeen Dagblad, "With regard to the dead pilot, we regret what happened.
"[72] On 16 November 1993, the United Nations Security Council instructed Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to "suspend arrest actions" and announced the release of all SNA prisoners of war.
[77][78][79] After the cessation of hostilities between the SNA and UNOSOM, Acting Special Representative Lansana Kouyate (replacing Adm. Johnathan Howe) successfully launched an initiative to normalize relations in March 1994.
[44] UNOSOM II’s complete departure did not result in the eruption of violence that was widely predicted, though the civil war continued to simmer with occasional clashes between factions.
[84] An October 1994 Central Intelligence Agency report assessed that the governments of both Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia and Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea had decided to arm and support the SNA.
That same year, the Somali National Movement (SNM) also suffered a serious fracture between President Ibrahim Egal of Somaliland and his predecessor Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur.
Fighting between the two factions broke out in Hargeisa in November 1994, which the forces of President Egal eventually won,[86] ending Aidids aspirations of incorporating the SNM into an SNA government.
