In 1075, Emperor Lý Nhân Tông ordered a preemptive invasion of Song dynasty territory with more than 80,000 soldiers, razing the city of Yongzhou after a 42-day siege.

In 1077, Song forces nearly reached Đại Việt's capital Thăng Long before being halted by General Lý Thường Kiệt at the Như Nguyệt River in modern-day Bắc Ninh Province.

After a prolonged stalemate and high casualties on both sides, Lý Thường Kiệt offered apologies for the invasion and the Song commander Guo Kui agreed to withdraw his troops, ending the war.

[18] Crucial influences for the lead up to the event include the Song-court sponsored New Policies promoted by Wang Anshi and efforts by the Lý court to consolidate peripheral fiefdoms.

The frontier administrator Wang Han visited Nùng Tông Ðán's camp at Leihuo (in Quang Nguyên) to discourage him from seeking inclusion in the Song dynasty since it would upset the Viet court.

A commissioner surveyed the region for able-bodied men to be organized under a guard commander selected from the area's prominent households, who received a specific signal banner to indicate their group's distinction.

In 1053, The ‘Great Martial Leader’ Di (Qing) put down the rebellion of the Quang Nguyên barbarian Nùng Trí Cao, the troops following the general’s expedition remained in the region to open up and settle the wasteland.

[27] Despite increased military tensions, the Lý court sought to defuse the situation by sending a delegation led by Bi Gia Dụ to Yongzhou.

[28] On the same day the Viet envoy Lý Kế Tiên prepared to depart Kaifeng, news arrived that Thàn Thiệu Tháị had attacked settlements in Guangnan West Circuit.

[30] To offset Tông Ðán's defection, the Song bestowed titles on Nùng Trí Hội and acknowledged him as the sole leader of Quảng Nguyên.

By late 1067, the Guizhou prefect Zhang Tian reported that Lưu Ký was in communication with Lư Báo, who had crossed into Song territory to seek personal glory.

[31] In late 1071, the Guangnan military commissioner Xiao Gu reported that Lưu Ký had been spotted near Shun'anzhou (in Quảng Nguyên) at the head of more than 200 men.

It was reported that the local chieftain of Lạng Châu, Dương Cảnh Thông, brought to court a white deer as tribute and was rewarded with the title "Grand Guardian.

The plan was for the first group, which included a strong contingent of uplanders and led by Nùng Tông Ðán, to invade and attract the attention of troops at Yongzhou.

In October 1075, Nùng Tông Ðán led 23,000 soldiers along the Zuo River into Song territory and captured Guwan, Taiping, Yongping, and Qianlong garrisons.

[17] Su Jian was unable to send for reinforcements and began posting impeachment documents throughout the streets in vain against Liu Yi (劉彝 1017-1086)–the Military Commissioner (jinglüe si 經略司) of Guizhou, who never came to relieve the besieged Yongzhou.

However, when the Viets returned shortly after, they brought local Chinese civilians who helped them make clay-bag berms to scale the Yongzhou walls, and were able to enter the city.

Thường Kiệt regarded the defense of this river as crucial to the war effort because it presented the last chance to protect the delta region, where the tombs of former rulers and the village of the dynasty's founder were located.

Thường Kiệt ordered his men to erect on the river's southern bank a large earthen rampart protected by lines of bamboo piles.

Song forces tried to cross again but Thường Kiệt had previously built a defense system of spikes under the Như Nguyệt riverbed, and they were again pushed back, sustaining 1,000 casualties.

[5][45] According to Chinese sources, "tropical climate and rampant disease" severely weakened Song's military forces while the Viet court feared the result of a prolonged war so close to the capital.

[5] Further negotiations took place from July 6 to August 8, 1084 at Yongping garrison in southern Guangnan, where Đại Việt's Director of Military Personnel Lê Văn Thịnh (fl.

According to Patricia Pelley, "to overcome this characterization, revolutionary writers were supposed to recite haranguing clichés about the essential unity and homogeneity of (Vietnam) and its indomitable spirit in the fight against foreign aggression.

One dissenting opinion is James A. Anderson, who argues that the opposite was true, and the Lý court felt threatened by the Song's increasing ties with Nong Zhigao's followers, and thus chose a preemptive attack as their best military option.

The illustration on page 142, painted by Xiong Kong Cheng (熊孔成), describes the bravery of Su Jian, who, with only three thousand men was able to put up a fierce, forty-two day, resistance against Vietnamese forces before finally succumbing to vastly superior numbers.

In China there was greater assimilation of the Zhuang into mainstream Han Chinese society while the Nùng in Vietnam remained fairly autonomous until the late modern period.

There is more evidence of the celebration of Nong Zhigao in Cao Bằng than in Guangxi, especially prior to the modern era, after which the local leader was inserted into nationalist histories as though he were a citizen of China or Vietnam.

[66] The Indochinese Communist Party suggested giving upland peoples and minorities full autonomy once the French colonial order was overthrown but gave little attention to them until 1941 when support from these communities became a strategic necessity.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam supervised state-sponsored migration to upland areas but the north did not experience a massive influx of Kinh Viets, so the ethnic balance around the Nùng Trí Cao temples remained fairly consistent.

References to "King Nùng" who had "raised high the banner proclaiming independence" have been replaced with floral patterns and pictures of horses, generic symbols associated with local heroes.