South American dreadnought race

A naval arms race among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—the wealthiest and most powerful countries in South America—began in the early twentieth century when the Brazilian government ordered three dreadnoughts, formidable battleships whose capabilities far outstripped older vessels in the world's navies.

Preliminarily named Rio de Janeiro, the incomplete vessel was sold to the Ottoman Empire in 1913 in the face of a slowing economy, significant political opposition after a 1910 naval revolt, and because the ship was outclassed by ever-larger super-dreadnoughts.

The First World War marked the end of the South American naval arms race, as the countries involved found themselves effectively unable to purchase additional capital ships abroad.

[19] Though the Brazilian government later eliminated the armored cruisers for monetary reasons, the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Júlio César de Noronha, signed a contract with Armstrong Whitworth for the planned battleships on 23 July 1906.

[20] The acquisition was supported by the incoming Brazilian president Afonso Pena, who told the National Congress of Brazil in November 1906 that the ships were necessary to replace the antiquated vessels composing the current navy and the battleship Aquidabã, which had unexpectedly blown up earlier that year.

[27] Still, these changes were made with the stipulation that the total price of the new naval program not exceed the original limit, so the increase in battleship tonnage was bought with the previous elimination of armored cruisers and decreasing the number of destroyer-type warships.

[36] Some newspapers and journals located around the world speculated that Brazil was acting as a proxy for a stronger country which would take possession of the two dreadnoughts soon after completion, as they did not believe that a previously insignificant geopolitical power would contract for such armament.

[41]On the other side of the Atlantic, in the midst of the Anglo–German naval arms race, members of the British House of Commons fretted over the battleships' possible destinations, though the Admiralty consistently stated that they did not believe any sale would occur.

[10] In November 1906, Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Augusto Montes de Oca [es], remarked that any one of the new Brazilian vessels could destroy the entire Argentine and Chilean fleets.

[56] After the Argentine government sent a naval delegation to Europe to solicit and evaluate armament companies' offers,[23] they received tenders from fifteen shipyards in five countries (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy), and conducted a drawn-out bidding process.

[61] This aroused further suspicion in the European bidders, who had previously believed that the United States was a non-contender, though Argentina did order twelve destroyers from British, French, and German shipyards to soften the blow.

[J] These bidders, along with newspapers like the Times (London), turned their anger on the American government under President William Howard Taft, whose so-called "Dollar Diplomacy" policy had led his State Department to go to great lengths to obtain the contracts.

[68] The American minister to Argentina, Charles H. Sherrill, cabled back to the United States that "this newspaper rivalry promises the early conclusion of a movement which means a third battleship whether by public subscription or by Government funds.

[71][L] The Chilean government delayed their naval plans after a financial depression brought on by the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake and a drastic fall in the nitrate market in 1907, but these economic problems were not enough to stop them from countering the dreadnoughts purchased by their traditional rival Argentina.

[78] Still, the American and German governments attempted to swing sentiment to their side by dispatching modern naval vessels (Delaware and Von der Tann, respectively) to Chilean ports.

The Ecuadorian Navy incorporated Libertador Bolívar, a torpedo gunboat bought from Chile, in 1907, complementing its fleet of two avisos, both around 800 long tons (810 t); two small steamers; and one minor coast guard ship.

[99] Almirante Latorre was not forcibly seized like the Ottoman Reşadiye and Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel (ex-Rio de Janeiro), two other ships being built for a foreign navy, as a result of Chile's "friendly neutral" status with the United Kingdom.

By mid-March, Armstrong's contacts in Brazil reported that Leão had convinced the recently elected President Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca to cancel the design with twelve 14-inch guns in favor of a smaller ship.

[108] In May, the president commented negatively on the new ship: When I assumed office, I found that my predecessor had signed a contract for the building of the battleship Rio de Janeiro, a vessel of 32,000 tons, with an armament of 14-inch guns.

[110] After numerous requests for design alterations from the Brazilian Navy were accommodated or rejected, a contract was signed for a ship with fourteen 12-inch guns on 3 June 1911 for £2,675,000, and Rio de Janeiro's keel was laid for the fourth time on 14 September.

[119][P] After selling Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian government asked Armstrong and Vickers to prepare designs for a new battleship, something strongly supported by the Navy League of Brazil (Liga Maritima).

Over the next three days, both houses of the Brazilian National Congress, led by the influential senator Ruy Barbosa, passed a general bill granting amnesty to all involved and ending the use of corporal punishment.

The revolt and consequent state of the navy, which was essentially unable to operate for fear of another rebellion, caused many leading Brazilians, including the president, prominent politicians like Barbosa and the Baron of Rio Branco, and the editor of the most respected newspaper in Brazil, Jornal do Commercio, to question the use of the new ships and support their sale to a foreign country.

[142] Although the Minas Geraes class remained in Brazilian hands, the mutiny had a clear detrimental effect on the navy's readiness: by 1912, an Armstrong agent stated that the ships were in terrible condition, with rust already forming on turrets and boilers.

[146] The Greek appetite to acquire one of these ships only grew after the surprise Ottoman acquisition of Rio de Janeiro gave them what one contemporary commentator called "assure[d] naval superiority".

To oppose them, Greece would have only Salamis, scheduled for completion months afterwards (March 1915), and two utterly obsolete pre-dreadnoughts, Kilkis and Lemnos, purchased from the United States in May 1914 to avert what seemed to be an imminent war.

[147] The United States, worried that its neutrality would not be respected and its technology would be released for study to a foreign country, put diplomatic pressure on the Argentine government to keep the ships, which it eventually did.

[179] Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States attempted to purchase Almirante Latorre, two destroyers, and a submarine tender, probably because the Chilean Navy had a reputation for keeping its ships in top-quality condition, but the offer was rejected.

The war had proved the obsolete status of battleships, so the South American navies were seeking cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, yet they ran into political difficulties in acquiring anything larger than Flower-class corvettes and River-class frigates.

The warships sold unilaterally changed the naval outlook of all three nations, leading them to accept parity (as opposed to the Argentine pre-war stipulation that its fleet be equal to Brazil's and Chile's combined).