Soviet invasion of South Sakhalin

This restraint order was lifted the next day, but due to communication delays, the frontline units did not receive the update in time, leading to overly passive tactical actions on the front lines.

At 4 pm on August 16, the Imperial General Headquarters issued Order 1382, directing all military forces, including the 5th Area Army in Hokkaido, to cease combat immediately, except for defensive actions in case of an enemy attack before ceasefire negotiations were established.

The War History series does support the idea that Division Commander Mineki’s recollections align more closely with the stance of the 5th Area Army, suggesting the order to defend South Sakhalin might not have been explicit.

[17] When Major Yoshio Suzuki, the Chief of Staff of the 88th Division, received Higuchi's combat order on the afternoon of August 16, preparations for ceasefire were already underway, such as the disbandment of mobilized units, the discharge of some troops, and the disposal of the regimental flag.

The frontline at Handa, defended by about 100 men (two infantry squads and 28 Border Police officers), held off the Soviet advance for an entire day with the support of tanks and aircraft before being nearly completely destroyed on August 12.

During the fighting on the central military road, by the morning of August 17, evacuation of the civilian population from Kamishikika had been completed, and the town was burned to the ground by Japanese forces' scorched earth tactics, along with an air raid by 20 Soviet aircraft.

Tōro Town Mayor Shōmatsu Abe (also the volunteer combat team leader) and others were sent to negotiate a ceasefire with the Soviet Naval Infantry after being informed of Japan's surrender and cessation of resistance.

According to Colonel Yasuo Suzuki, chief of staff of the 88th Division, a special security unit was formed from 200 local veterans, and three additional companies were quickly sent to the Esutoru area upon hearing that the enemy was attempting to land on the 13th.

However, Suzuki believed that if the Soviet forces launched a full-scale landing, the situation would be hopeless, so he instructed that the defense be moved to Upper Esutoru, located 24 kilometers inland on a mountain.

[41] When Yoshino arrived in Upper Esutoru, he found the soldiers unwilling to surrender their guns, and in order to avoid unnecessary conflict, he had them withdraw to the Baiun Gorge, a watershed area.

According to author and critic Teruko Yoshitake, Esutoru was an important defensive position, with a volunteer force led by local officials and student soldiers, as well as women’s units, fighting fiercely with bamboo spears, resulting in casualties.

[46][42] The town of Kami-Esutori was bombed and burnt to the ground on the afternoon of 17 August, and as it was evacuated, the Special Security Forces and Volunteer Combat Teams were disbanded with members returning to their families.

The 25th Infantry Regiment's 1st Battalion Commander, Major Yoshio Nakagawa, explained to the War History Room at the Ministry of Defense that the decision was based on the assumption that Soviet forces would be peacefully occupying the area, and they wanted to prevent civilian casualties in case of unexpected situations.

[63] In Michishita’s memoir "Reflections on Moeka Town during Soviet Occupation," he writes that Mayor Takahashi, dressed in national clothing and wearing gaiters, was mistaken for a soldier and shot.

A female restaurant owner, who had taken refuge in an air raid shelter, saw bullets flying inside and, realizing she could not avoid them, heard a Soviet soldier calling for her to "raise your hands and come out."

[46] Seeing bloodied women lying on the ground and fires starting around her, she shouted loudly, urging those inside to come out immediately or risk burning to death, and telling people to take off their uniforms to avoid being mistaken for soldiers.

[42] Lieutenant Colonel Nakagawa, commanding the 1st Battalion of the Japanese 25th Infantry Regiment, learned of the Soviet naval vessels' approach through communication on the night or early morning, prepared a white flag, and made arrangements for a military envoy.

In response to inquiries, Nakagawa later explained that the "defensive combat" was in line with the military's established regulations under the Guard Duty Order, as recognized by both Yomiuri Shimbun[53] and the War History Room.

Although Japan had agreed to the Potsdam Declaration, Soviet planes violated this norm, and according to historian Nikolai Vishnevsky, the aircraft took off from the Russian Far East, and news of the ceasefire negotiations had not reached them in time.

[32][17] This was likely due to a stern warning received by the 5th Area Army from General Staff Officer Shigefuru Asao, who had gone to Manchuria for ceasefire negotiations, on August 21, urging against continuing combat under the pretext of self-defense.

[70][17] On August 22, the 5th Area Army transmitted the weapons surrender approval from the Imperial General Headquarters to the 88th Division, replacing the previous order to defend southern Sakhalin, and a ceasefire agreement was reached with the Soviet forces at Chitose Town.

However, when the Imperial General Headquarters used this term, combat continued against the Soviet forces in Manchuria, and it was intended to apply only if attacks occurred during ceasefire negotiations, assuming surrender under the Potsdam Declaration.

On August 16, Stalin proposed to the United States to divide Hokkaido along a line from Rumoi to Kushiro, with the northeastern part to be occupied by the Soviet Union, beyond the agreements made at the Yalta Conference.

According to former National Defense Medical University professor Takashi Nakayama, the delay of Soviet action was due to Stalin's consideration of whether the occupation of Hokkaido could be established as a fait accompli before the signing of Japan's surrender documents (September 2).

[84] Conversely, Sakhalin War researcher Ken'yu Fujimura suggests that the attacks on civilian ships might have been a provocation designed to trigger Japanese retaliation and create a pretext for full-scale military action against Hokkaido.

[82] From historical records, it appears that Stalin considered occupying Hokkaido's northern region, but after receiving Truman's rejection, Soviet forces eventually shifted their focus to reinforcing their Kuril Island operations.

After the battle, the Soviet Union (later the Russian Federation after its collapse) effectively controlled southern Sakhalin, while Japan continues to assert the region as an area with disputed territorial status.

On August 9, following the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, the Governor of Otsu Sakhalin, the Chief of Staff of the 88th Division, and the Navy Military Attaché confirmed the aforementioned prior agreement and the evacuation of civilians to Hokkaido began.

According to Ministry of Health and Welfare documents, around 2,000 civilians were killed in air raids, naval shelling, and ground combat on the island, including approximately 1,000 in Moeka, 170-180 in Taro, 190 in Esutori, 100 in Toyohara, 70 in Shikuka, and 60 in Ochiai.

[100][101][42] On the other hand, during the Battle of Esutori on August 16, 12 female watch-post personnel were saved by a special security unit led by Sergeant Nakagaki, who managed to persuade them not to commit suicide, helping them retreat under guard.

South Sakhalin offensive
Subprefectures of Karafuto Prefecture
Japanese Border Police : Countering the Soviet Army along with Army forces
The urban area of Esutoru Town (Hama District)
The city of Maoka Town before the Soviet military invasion
A Soviet soldier advances over the bodies of Japanese soldiers at Mooka and the Kumosa Pass.
The Tōhō Line's Takaradai Loop, where the Soviet landing forces and Japanese troops engaged in combat near Moeka on August 21–22