Stanley Plan
[6][7] The constitutional invalidity of the Stanley plan led new governor of Virginia, J. Lindsay Almond, also a Democrat, to propose "passive resistance" to school integration in 1959.
[14] Top leaders in the Byrd Organization, such as Governor Thomas B. Stanley and then–Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond, were also at first reserved in their reaction to the Brown ruling.
[16] Kilpatrick adopted the pre–American Civil War constitutional theory of interposition, and began publicly pushing for the state of Virginia to actively oppose the Supreme Court.
"[22] On August 30, 1954, Governor Stanley announced the appointment of a commission, chaired by State Senator Garland Gray, to recommend a legislative response to Brown.
[28] (In 1954, the Virginia General Assembly had enacted legislation providing educational vouchers to underage dependents of veterans who were wounded or had died in World War II).
Kilpatrick and several Virginia political leaders had supported vouchers as a way of circumventing desegregation,[28][29] and the Almond decision struck directly at this proposal.
[32] Governor Stanley called the General Assembly into special session on November 30, 1955, to consider adopting the Gray Commission's report (although not its actual recommendations).
Among these were Representative (and former Governor) William M. Tuck, Virginia House Speaker E. Blackburn Moore (a close friend of Byrd's), the Defenders, Kilpatrick, and even Gray himself.
[37][38] For nearly three weeks in late November and early December, Kilpatrick wrote almost daily in the pages of the Richmond News Leader in favor of interposition.
[53][54] Byrd and the other extreme segregationists hoped that public opinion would continue to harden against Brown, allowing political leaders to adopt interposition rather than a more moderate response.
[58][59] Moderate segregationists began to worry that public education would be destroyed by tuition vouchers, and were not willing to implement such a plan even if it meant saving segregation.
Although calls for a special session of the legislature had been made in February and March, Governor Stanley was not initially receptive to the idea at the beginning of April.
[68] In mid-April, Virginia Lieutenant Governor Gi Stevens urged Stanley to call a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the Gray Commission proposals.
[75] Governor Stanley's reversal of position regarding the special session seemed inexplicable, especially in light of the lack of new legislative proposals, but events had transpired which had changed his mind.
[81] Stanley announced that he was going to support a special session of the legislature, and that if the Gray Commission could not come up with any new proposals then he himself would craft bills for the General Assembly to consider.
[96] Governor Stanley released his legislative proposal to implement "massive resistance" on July 23, 1956, and set August 27, 1956, as the start of the General Assembly's special session.
[103] Almond agreed, and on August 1 told the press that Judge Bryan's decision left open the possibility of implementing a pupil assignment plan that would be neutral on its face but which could keep schools segregated.
[108] On August 14, Governor Stanley announced publicly that the main thrust of his legislative proposal would be to withhold funds from any local school district which integrated.
In a closed-door meeting with Assembly delegates attending the 1956 Democratic National Convention, Stanley again insisted on the authority to withhold state funds from any school district which integrated.
[122] The administration immediately entered into negotiations to amend the Stanley plan to allow parents to sue a school district to force it to accept state funds (and resegregate).
[131] The new bill expanded on the limited criteria previously proposed by the governor by declaring that pupil assignment would be made in order to ensure "efficient" (e.g., segegrated)[120][125] operation of the schools and to reduce a clear and present danger to the public safety of citizens in those districts which integrated.
[134] On September 10, Delegate C. Harrison Mann introduced 16 bills aimed at curbing the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in Virginia.
[136] Attorney General Almond voiced his opinion that the new plan would not stop integrationist lawsuits, and that making the governor an agent of the legislature was clearly unconstitutional.
By January, with even Virginia courts siding against the state and citizens increasingly angry that their children's education was being sacrificed to maintain segregation,[158] Almond concluded that the Stanley plan was no longer viable.
[8] Almond's program became known by some as "passive resistance" and "freedom of choice" (although it is also sometimes called "tokenism" or "containment"), a legislative approach intended to shift Virginia toward desegregation in the face of a hostile electorate.
[159][160][161] On February 2, 1959, Governor Almond refused to intervene as 17 African American students in Norfolk and four in Arlington County peacefully enrolled in formerly all-white schools.
[165] Legislation enacted by the Assembly placed the burden on often-poor African American parents to "prove" that their child should be enrolled in an all-white school.
In 1951, the NAACP filed suit on behalf of African American children in Prince Edward County demanding racial integration of the public schools.
[172] The United States Department of Justice, citing the "extraordinary history" of the Prince Edward County case, intervened to support the black parents.
[181] In a 6-to-3 ruling in 1963 that gave broad protection to public interest legal organizations, the U.S. Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button, held that all five of the barratry, champerty, and maintenance laws violated the 1st and 14th Amendments to the constitution.
