Most strong ciphers have the desirable property of making the payload appear indistinguishable from uniformly-distributed noise, which can make detection efforts more difficult, and save the steganographic encoding technique the trouble of having to distribute the signal energy evenly (but see above concerning errors emulating the native noise of the carrier).
If inspection of a storage device is considered very likely, the steganographer may attempt to barrage a potential analyst with, effectively, misinformation.
This may be a large set of files encoded with anything from random data, to white noise, to meaningless drivel, to deliberately misleading information.
The encoding density on these files may be slightly higher than the "real" ones; likewise, the possible use of multiple algorithms of varying detectability should be considered.
Obtaining a warrant or taking other actions based solely on steganalytic evidence is a very dicey proposition unless a payload has been completely recovered and decrypted, because otherwise all the analyst has is a statistic indicating that a file may have been modified, and that modification may have been the result of steganographic encoding.