Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
[6] Understanding the importance of Germany's radar sites, the Allies directed attacks against these installations and introduced new technology to counteract the effects of radar-directed AAA, including CARPET (US) and WINDOW (UK).
Bombing missions were also carried out to accomplish the physical destruction of AAA sites, using imagery intelligence to locate the weapons and employing both heavy bombers and fighter-bombers to destroy them.
The largest SEAD mission in history took place on March 24, 1945, when artillery forces of the British XII Corps attempted to knock out the local German air defense network in support of Operation Varsity.
They were thus able to more effectively attack ground targets and escape, and while both jet- and propeller-driven aircraft participated in the Korean War the latter suffered heavier losses and were largely phased out by the end of the conflict.
[12] As the war progressed, the Communists developed a highly centralized integrated air defense network, incorporating early-warning radars, ground-controlled interception (GCI) and AAA.
This included the construction of sixty SA-2 Guideline SAM sites by the end of 1965 which, though only accomplishing one hit for every thirteen missiles fired, were responsible for shooting down nearly 15% of American aircraft lost that year.
Early attempts to counter this system consisted of modified F-100 Super Sabres using crude homing equipment to locate and bomb radar-guided SAM and AAA sites, but these missions incurred heavy losses and the threat to American aircraft continued to grow.
[15] Eventually new SEAD-dedicated aircraft were introduced, the Air Force's EF-105F/F-105G Thunderchief and Navy's A-6B Intruder, which mounted more sophisticated detection equipment and carried the AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missiles (ARMs).
These fighter-bombers became very adept at tracking down and destroying ground-based air defense weapons, such that it became common for a vast majority of NVA SAM operators to turn off their radars whenever an F-105G was spotted.
Tactics and technology had evolved which improved the suppression of individual SAM sites, however the American military still failed to consider the integrated nature of North Vietnam's air defense network.
[27][28] Israel's attack on the SAMs was inadvertently assisted by the Syrians, who often placed their sites in sub-optimal positions and failed to relocate their equipment, use dummy radars or maintain active combat air patrol.
In response to the attacks, the Syrians launched a large number of fighter aircraft, however without the aid of their radar and GCI facilities, these forces were "flying blind" and suffered crippling losses in the resulting air-to-air combat.
[29][28] Operation El Dorado Canyon, the United States' response to the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing, employed lessons learned from the Bekaa Valley campaign, including extensive planning and practice runs.
For several reasons, F-4G Wild Weasels could not take part in El Dorado Canyon, requiring the use of the Navy's carrier-borne A-7E Corsair IIs and F/A-18 Hornets to attack Libyan SAM sites.
Their lack of the Wild Weasel's specialized equipment required these fighters to fire their HARMs preemptively at Libyan SAM sites, a costly and wasteful method which nevertheless was effective due to the limited nature of the raid.
In its initial limited form, Instant Thunder called for three dedicated SEAD squadrons which would significantly degrade the IADS enough to allow decimating strikes against Iraq's military and political leadership and other strategic targets.
[36] This role for SEAD was further expanded as the mission grew in scope, involving a larger number of aircraft to completely destroy the air defenses protecting southern Iraq and Kuwait.
[38][39] In addition to traditional SEAD systems the Persian Gulf War would also see the use of unconventional assets in knocking out Iraq's air defenses, in particular cruise missiles and F-117A Nighthawks, which would be used to attack sensitive targets.
[40] The opening shots of Operation Desert Storm were fired on January 17 in pursuit of defense-suppression: at 2:20AM local time Task Force Normandy, a group of twelve American helicopters, infiltrated into Iraq with the goal of destroying two early-warning radar sites.
Among the first targets hit by F-117As attacking into Baghdad, bombs damaged the Al Taqaddum IOC and Talil SOC, shortly followed by Tomahawk strikes that disabled the electrical grid upon which Kari depended; reportedly some used special warheads filled with carbon fiber bundles to short-circuit the network.
Those which weren't specifically directed to suppress air defenses had significant SEAD escort, including the use of BQM-74 drones and ADM-141 TALD decoys which would both "take the hit" for the manned airplanes and cause the Iraqis to reveal their position when they tracked or fired upon the lure.
With Kari degraded due to the disabling of the civilian electrical grid the Iraqi SAMs were forced to use their organic radar, producing what one pilot called "HARM Heaven".
Although the Iraqis would replace most destroyed radars and bring back many IOCs and SOCs to at least partial operation, this was done so in an unorganized manner, with the Coalition continuing to bomb any reactivated sites.
[44] Coalition aircraft conducting strategic bombing and interdiction inside Iraq were now free to operate at medium altitudes of 10,000 ft (3,000 m) and higher with no danger of SAM activity.
[45] Baghdad's heavy AAA defenses also continued to make it a difficult target to attack, as Coalition forces found out during an attempted strike on January 19 against the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.
[48] Many NATO aircraft were furnished with new towed decoys designed to lure away any missiles fired at them, and reportedly for the first time cyberwarfare was used to target Yugoslav air defense computer systems.
The US Air Force had allowed its electronic warfare branch to atrophy in the years after the Gulf War, resulting in greater response times to engaging a SAM threat.
These missiles are equipped with relatively small warheads, limiting collateral damage, but can easily destroy radar antennae and thus cripple an enemy's air defense system.
This is due to the fact many SAM sites are dispersed over a fairly wide area (in order to increase the difficulty of inflicting serious damage on the battery) and the relative "softness" of the targets (unarmored missile launchers, exposed radar antennas, etc.).
After World War II, the combined arms nature of warfare meant an increased role in ground forces performing SEAD missions in support of air operations.
