[1] Following the example of the influential logician Dignāga, Bhāviveka used autonomous syllogistic reasoning (svātantra) syllogisms in the explanation of Madhyamaka.
[note 2] Candrakīrti's works had no influence on Indian and early Tibetan Madhayamaka, but started to rise to prominence in Tibet in the 12th century.
Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), the founder of the Gelugpa school and the most outspoken proponent of the distinction, followed Candrakīrti in his rejection of Bhavaviveka's arguments.
Śāntarakṣita established Buddhism in Tibet, and his Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka was the primary philosophic viewpoint until the 12th century, when the works of Candrakīrti were first translated into Tibetan.
For the Sakya and Nyingma schools, which participated in the Rimé movement, the Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction is generally viewed to be of lesser importance.
In this context Tenzin Gyatso, his holiness the Dalai Lama, says in a forward to Shantideva's book "A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life," a work based on the idea that the Mahayana teachings are focused on cultivating a mind wishing to benefit other sentient beings, that Shantideva’s philosophical stance follows the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka viewpoint of Chandrakīrti.
It arises from Bhāvaviveka's criticism that Buddhapālita ought not to have relied solely on reductio ad absurdum argumentation —hence the name "Prāsangika", from prāsanga ("consequence")—but ought to have set forth "autonomous" (svātantra) syllogisms of his own.
[16][note 3] Bhāviveka (c. 500 – c. 578 CE) argued that autonomous syllogistic reasoning was required when explaining or commenting on Nagarjuna's teachings on voidness or essencelessness.
[17][note 4] To be able to use syllogistic reasoning, both parties need to share a common object of discussion at the conventional level.
[note 6] Bhāviveka further argued that Buddhapalita only showed the logical consequences, and incoherence, of the Samkhya's views on causation and inherent existence, but failed to address their arguments against Buddhist critiques.
[20] To facilitate the possibility of discussing Madhyamaka with opponents, Bhāviveka made a provisional division of the two truths, accepting that phenomena exist "according to their characteristics.
[24] According to Candrakīrti, this mode of thinking is a subtle form of grasping at inherent existence: one's mind is still searching for some way to hold on to an essence, self, or identity for conventionally perceived objects.
"[24] The only aim of consequential arguments "is to introduce the mind to the direct knowledge of emptiness, not an intellectual understanding of it,"[24] making "no concessions to the spiritually unprepared.
"[24] Candrakīrti's criticism was "part of a wider rejection of the logico-epistemological tradition of Dignāga, which he regarded as a misguided attempt to find "philosophical completeness" and a sense of intellectual security that is antithetical to the fundamental insight of Madhyamaka.
[24] In the absence of any agreement between Mādhyamikas and substantialists, prasaṅga is the best approach "to indicate the ultimate without making statements that [...] compromise or [...] obscure their own position.
[29] A common distinction of Madhyamaka teachings was given by Jñanasutra (Wylie: ye shes sde, 8th–9th centuries), a student of Śāntarakṣita:[30] The difference lies in their "acceptance or rejection of extramental phenomena on the conventional level.
"[29] While Bhavaviveka considered material phenomena at the conventional level as to be existent outside the mind, he applied Sautrāntika terminology to describe and explain them.
"[33][note 8] Later Gelugpa scholars as well as Nyingmapas, after Candrakīrti's works were translated in Tibetan in the 12th century,[29] considered both of the above to constitute subdivisions of Svātantrika, however, under the names of "Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and "Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka."
[note 9] Initially, this new distinction based on Candrakīrti's Prasannapada met with fierce resistance in Tibet, but gained in popularity and was strongly supported by Je Tsongkhapa[29] (1357 – 1419 CE).
"[11] Tsongkhapa was a powerful personality with a large following, but he too met with a strong resistance, especially within the Sakya school to which he originally belonged.
This gave the Gelugpa school a strong political power, and the means to effectively ban the writings of Tsongkhapa's critics.
[29] For Tsongkhapa, the Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction centers around the usage of autonomous syllogistic reasoning to convince opponents of the Madhyamaka point of view, and the implications of the establishment of conventional existence 'according to characteristics'.
[37][web 2][note 12] According to Tsongkhapa, if both people in a debate or discussion have a valid understanding of emptiness already, then autonomous syllogistic arguments could be quite effective.
[42] Ju Mipham's commentary on Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra ("The Adornment of the Middle Way") is an example of this new impetus to older strands of Tibetan Buddhism.
They are: (1) the āryas' meditation on emptiness would destroy phenomena; (2) production according to its characteristics could not be disproved on the ultimate level; and (3) the conventional truth would resist absolute analysis.
[51] Mainstream Sakyas (following Rongtön and Gorampa) also hold the position that the distinction between these two schools is merely of a pedagogical nature.
The 14th Dalai Lama has published works like The Gelug/Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra which seem to be influenced by the views of Śāntarakṣita and Padmasambhava, and contain a blend of Tantric theory, Chittamātra, and Madyamaka-Prāsaṅgika.