The case arose after Moïse Amselem, his youngest son David, and René Elhadad, in Montreal erected sukkahs on their balconies in a residential building which they owned.

However, those who managed the buildings, Syndicat Northcrest, claimed the sukkahs violated by-laws forbidding structures to be built on the balconies.

He examined whether the by-laws violated the freedom of religion of the Orthodox Jews, and whether Syndicat Northcrest's opposition to the sukkahs was protected by rights to enjoy property under the Quebec Charter.

He decided that religion is a thorough set of beliefs regarding a higher power, tied with a person's view of him or herself and his/her needs to realize spiritual completeness.

[5] These arguments were reinforced by a desire that secular governments and courts should not judge which religious practices are needed and which are not; this was to make legal decisions regarding moral beliefs.

[9] The court will determine whether a sufficiently large violation of freedom of religion has occurred to raise challenges under the Quebec and Canadian Charters.

[11] Turning back to this case, the Supreme Court observed Syndicat Northcrest had argued freedom of religion was limited here by rights to enjoy property and to personal security.

The Supreme Court also noted the Jews might have wanted sukkahs for religious reasons, regardless of whether they were necessary; this also undermined the view that past practices should be studied.

The Court was unconvinced the property value would drop because of lack of evidence, and the attractiveness of the building for nine days every year was held to be a small issue, especially in the context of the importance of multiculturalism.

While Bastarache noted one Jew might have a right to an individual sukkah, this needed to be balanced against "proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec", as required by the Quebec Charter.

Bastarache wrote that "it is difficult to imagine how granting a right of way in emergency situations, which is essential to the safety of all the occupants of the co-owned property, could fail to justify the prohibition against setting up sukkahs, especially in light of the compromise proposed by the respondent.